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Rights-of-Way Redux: Municipal Fees on




The golden goose again is being plucked. Across the country,
municipalities are supplementing their general fund revenues through
"fees," "taxes," and "rents" charged to wireline telecommunications and
cable television companies occupying municipal rights-of-way.1 These
charges typically are imposed as a percentage of the companies' gross
revenues. As the companies' revenues increase with consumer
acceptance of high-speed Internet access, data, digital video and other
"broadband" services, municipalities are eagerly pocketing their share.
Naturally, the goose is not happy. Wireline providers are being
squeezed between the growing competition from companies that are not
similarly taxed and the rising size of the exactions demanded by the
* Partner, Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., Washington, D.C. (gfgillespie@hhlaw.com).
J.D., Virginia Law School; B.A., Williams College (history). The author would like to
thank Charlton Copeland for helping to get this article underway.
1. For convenience, when discussing generally both wireline telecommunications
and cable companies together, the term "wireline companies" will be used.
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municipal regulators. Wireless and satellite providers are offering
increasingly stiff competition to the companies that use the municipal
streets for their wired services. 2  Already suffering losses in market
share, wireline companies can ill-afford municipal charges that are not
shared by their competitors.3 And the stakes are growing with each new
service offered.4 The more money that wireline companies are able to
generate, the deeper the impact of fees calculated as a percentage of
revenues. At the same time, the total dollar amounts involved are
increasingly worth fighting over.
State and federal public policy makers have noticed, and they are
concerned about the impact of municipal fees on the roll-out and health
of new wireline services. Michael Powell, Chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission, recently commended the National
2. The rapid growth of cellular telephone service threatens wireline telephone
service growth. The mobile telephone market experienced a twenty-eight percent
increase in 2000 and has a nationwide penetration rate of thirty-nine percent. 6 FED.
COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, FCC 01-192, IN THE MATTER OF IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECTION 6002(B) OF THE OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993: ANNUAL
REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE MARKET CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO
COMMERCIAL MOBILE SERVICES 21 (2001) [hereinafter MOBILE SERVICES REPORT]. There
are 2.5 million mobile internet users. Id. at 4.
Cable television operators, meanwhile, are fighting an intense competitive battle
in many markets. The number of customers of direct broadcast satellite [hereinafter
DBS] service alone grew at more than nineteen percent from June 2000 to June 2001 and
is growing at over 8500 subscribers a day. Competition to cable is also offered by other
companies that do not use the public rights-of-way, including satellite master antenna
companies (offering service to multiple dwelling units through rooftop antennas) and
multichannel multipoint distribution service (also known as wireless cable). 8 FED.
COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, FCC 01-389, IN THE MATTER OF ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF
THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE MARKET FOR THE DELIVERY OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING
paras. 57-58 (2002) [hereinafter VIDEO PROGRAMMING REPORT].
3. Wireless, satellite, and satellite master antenna television companies now
account for twenty-two percent .of the market for multichannel video programming
distribution [hereinafter MVPD]. VIDEO PROGRAMMING REPORT, supra note 2, para. 5.
Three of every four new MVPD customers are signing up for DBS. See id. paras. 18, 57.
It is estimated that three to five percent of mobile telephone subscribers do not have a
wireline phone. MOBILE SERVICES REPORT, supra note 2, at 32 & n.207. One survey
showed that twelve percent of respondents purchased a wireless phone instead of adding
a wireline phone. Id. at 33. A wireless provider whose business plan is to compete
directly with wireline telephone service has reported that seven percent of its customers
in Nashville and Chattanooga have given up their wireline phones. The same company
reports that sixty percent of its customers use their wireless phones as their primary
phone. Id. at 34.
4. Cable revenues from advanced services (advanced analog, digital video, high-
speed data, cable telephony, interactive services, and games) rose last year to $5.6
billion-an increase of 171.2%. VIDEO PROGRAMMING REPORT, supra note 2, app. tbl. B-
4. The average household expenditure for telephone service increased from $325 in 1980
to $849 in 1999. INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N,




Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners ("NARUC") for
"pushing for a dialogue" with municipalities on the need for fair access
to rights-of-way. 5  The NARUC action to which Chairman Powell
referred involved a resolution encouraging local governments to provide
right-of-way access to wireline companies at "reasonable" rates.6
Meanwhile, the Administrator of the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration has sought to identify "positive models" of
state and local right-of-way management that can be used in other
jurisdictions.7
The volume of litigation between wireline companies and
municipalities, not surprisingly, is in crescendo. But, instead of leading
to a settled doctrine of law, the increased litigation continues to dispense
wildly inconsistent judicial decisions. The theories offered by the
litigants differ from case to case, and the decisions show little
consistency, even when based on similar facts. It is a situation that one
might expect of courts and litigants navigating a whole new world of
unfamiliar issues.
But many of the issues should not be unfamiliar. The present
municipal efforts to take a meaningful share of the revenues generated
though new electronic services is by no means unprecedented. Indeed, in
the nineteenth century, municipalities attempted to ride the back of the
then-exciting new technologies of the telegraph and telephone.
Beginning in the 1880s, municipalities throughout the nation made a
massive push to extract their toll from companies that used the public
streets to run their wires. These municipalities began to impose annual
fees on telegraph and telephone poles placed in the public rights-of-way.
The fees were sometimes enormous, totaling as much as forty-four
percent or more of the assessed value of the wireline companies'
facilities.8
The municipal ambition to raise revenues from wireline companies
was met with an equally intense effort by the companies to obtain
judicial relief. An avalanche of litigation ensued; dozens of cases
reached the Supreme Court and the highest state courts in the latter part
5. FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, CC Docket No. 02-33, IN THE MATTER OF
APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK FOR BROADBAND ACCESS TO THE INTERNET OVER WIRELINE
FACILITIES (2000) (separate statement of Chairman Powell).
6. Herb Kirchhoff, NARUC Panel Adopts Satellite and Special Access Positions,
COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Feb. 13, 2002, at 2.
7. Nancy J. Victory, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Commerce, Together
on the Right Track: Managing Access to Public Roads and Rights of Way, Address
Before the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners Committee on
Telecommunications (Feb. 12, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/speeches/2002/naruc021202.htm).
8. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth. 9
The courts, in the main, rejected municipal efforts to raise revenues
from the telegraph and telephone companies and required that municipal
fees be limited to regulatory costs. But in 1893, in City of St. Louis v.
Western Union Telegraph Co.,' 0 the Supreme Court interjected a new
concept into the debate. For the first time the Court suggested that
municipal wireline fees were "in the nature of rental" for occupancy of a
small portion of the streets. On rehearing of the case, the Court
immediately pulled back from the theory, and the Court never clearly
relied on it to validate a municipal fee.1" But the rental theory, once
loosed, was never quite recaptured, and it has now reappeared to create
confusion in the new generation of cases concerning municipal wireline
fees.
In an effort to restore some grounding to the issues related to
municipal right-of-way fees, this article begins by tracing municipal
authority to impose wireline charges back to the origin of
telecommunications. After setting forth the historic bases for municipal
ownership and control of streets, the article addresses the different
theories used over the years in analyzing municipal charges imposed on
wireline companies using public rights-of-way. This article considers
whether municipal exactions can be justified as regulatory fees, rentals of
the streets, franchise fees or taxes. Then the article addresses the overlay
of federal statutes, the Telecommunications Act of 199612 and the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("Cable Act"). 13 In conclusion, this
article suggests that there is no reasonable basis today for imposing
municipal revenue-generating charges on telecommunications
companies, or, in the absence of specific state laws, on cable operators.
II. An Historical Perspective
A. Municipal Ownership and Control of the Streets
Municipal streets are no more like private property than municipal
corporations are like private corporations. Municipalities "are
incorporated for public, and not private, objects. They are allowed to
9. See infra notes 51-94 and accompanying text.
10. 148 U.S. 92, reh'g denied, 149 U.S. 465 (1893).
11. See City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. at 465-67.
12. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. The
Telecommunications Act amended the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 101-
239, 103 Stat 2131 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-573 (2001)). When
referring to sections of the Telecommunications Act, this article will generally use the
section numbers in the Communications Act, for ease of reference.
13. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779.
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hold privileges or property only for public purposes. ' 4 Municipalities
have no inherent powers;1 5 all municipal power stems from the state. 16 If
the municipality does not derive a particular power directly from the
state constitution, then it must find the power in a statute.
1 7
Municipal streets are acquired directly from the state or indirectly
through use of the state's sovereign power of eminent domain. In many
cases, streets are not owned in fee simple by the municipality, but are
held only by easement.' 8 Even where the municipality has a fee simple
interest, that interest is held in "trust for the public."' 9 It is a widely
accepted principle of long standing that "[t]he interest [of a city in its
streets] is exclusively publici juris, and is, in any aspect, totally unlike
property of a private corporation, which is held for its own benefit and
used for its private gain or advantage."
20
Courts commonly have distinguished between property acquired by
municipalities in the normal course of business, and streets acquired
14. Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. 511, 534 (1850).
15. Vill. of Lombard v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 90 N.E.2d 105, 108 (Ill. 1950); 2 C.
DALLAS SANDS ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 13.02 (1997).
16. Judge John Forrest Dillon, whose Commentaries on the Law of Municipal
Corporations served as the Bible on municipal law and regulation for decades, stated:
As the highways of a State, including streets in cities, are under the paramount
and primary control of the legislature, and as all municipal powers are derived
from the legislature, it follows that the authority of municipalities over streets,
and the uses to which they may legitimately be put, depends, within
constitutional limitations, entirely upon their charters or the legislative
enactments applicable to them.
JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 1846-1847
(5th ed. 1911); see also Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 795 P.2d 298, 304 (Idaho 1990)
(noting municipality empowered only by state constitution or legislature); SANDS ET AL.,
supra note 15, § 13.01.
17. As was stated in People v. Kerr:
The city corporation, as feeholder of the streets, in trust, for public use as
highways, is but an agent of the State. Any control which it exercises over
them, or the power of regulating their use, is a mere police or governmental
power delegated by the State, subject to its control and direction, and to be
exercised in strict subordination to its will.
27 N.Y. 188, 213 (1863).
18. See also Sears v. City of Chicago, 93 N.E. 158, 160-61 (Ill. 1910); In re John &
Cherry Streets, 19 Wend. 659, 674-78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839).
19. Again, quoting People v. Kerr:
By an exercise of State power, [the streets] were taken or confiscated to public
use .... It cannot be pretended that the absolute title and estate in the land
embraced within the streets, have ever been granted to the corporation from any
source. Whatever estate or interest it holds, either conferred by the Dongan
charter or by the State, is in trust for the public use.
27 N.Y. at 211-12; see also Vill. of Lombard v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 90 N.E.2d at 109; City
of Vicksburg v. Marshall, 59 Miss. 563, 571 (1882).
20. Kerr, 27 N.Y. at 200.
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from the state or under eminent domain powers.2 1 For example, in City
of Des Moines v. Iowa Telephone Co.,22 the Iowa Supreme Court rejected
the idea that the municipality had the same rights in its streets that it had
in other municipal property.23 Relying heavily on an earlier decision by
Judge Dillon, the most influential commentator on municipal law of the
era, the court observed that the state legislature had total control of the
municipal streets.24 The municipality's interest in the streets was unlike
its ownership interest in "a market house, a public hall, or the like. 25
Although the municipality had ownership interests in the "market house"
and "public hall," similar to the ownership interest of a private party, the
municipality's ownership interest in the streets was "not of this nature. 26
27The municipality had no "proprietary rights" in its streets. Numerous
other cases have echoed this thought that the ownership interest
municipalities hold in their streets is "governmental," and not
"proprietary. 28
The plain implication of these differing ownership interests is that
municipalities do not have the same inherent rights to charge for the use
of the streets as they might have to charge for the use of other property.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, also quoting from Judge Dillon,
observed in 1895 that "it is a mistake to suppose that when the fee of the
streets is in the city, in trust for the public, the city is constitutionally and
necessarily entitled to compensation, the same as a private proprietor
21. Byron and William Elliott, the authors of an early and seminal treatise on public
streets, stated:
[I]f the state should take land for the purpose of a public way the purpose
would be essentially public, but if it should buy in land sold upon foreclosure
of a mortgage executed to it, or should take property in payment of a debt due
to it, the purpose for which the property would be held would be, in a qualified
sense, private.
1 BYRON K. ELLIOTT & WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ROADS &
STREETS § 150 (4th ed. 1926).
22. 162 N.W. 323 (Iowa 1917).
23. Id. at 325. The court thus described the city's position: "Reduced to its last
analysis the proposition is this: The city owns the fee to its streets, alleys, and public
places, and is entitled to compensation for the use thereof to the same extent as any
private party would be under like circumstances .... " Id.
24. Id. (citing City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455
(1868)).
25. Id. at 326 (quoting Clinton, 24 Iowa 455).
26. Id. at 327.
27. Id. at331.
28. City & County of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748, 761 (Colo. 2001) (en
banc); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 620 N.E.2d 1040, 1044 (111.
1993); City of New York v. Bee Line Inc., 284 N.Y.S. 452, 456 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935);
City of Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., 59 N.E. 781, 784 (Ohio 1901). "When a
fee is granted, the corporation within which the highway is situated takes it in trust for
public use and does not acquire an absolute proprietary title." ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra
note 21, § 125.
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holding the fee.",29 Municipalities have no rights to profit from their
streets, unless specifically authorized by the state.30
Although the primary use of the streets is the movement of
pedestrians and vehicles, courts have long recognized that the streets
may also properly be used for the laying of water, gas and sewer pipes,
and for the placement of telegraph and telephone infrastructure. 3 Utility
poles and the wires that are attached to them are "private property," but
property "devoted to the public use. 32  Use of the streets for these
purposes is not only consistent with the public purpose for which the
streets were dedicated but benefits the municipality. For example,
telegraph and telephone services have been recognized to reduce the
amount of traffic on the streets.33 In addition, courts have recognized
that telephone and telegraph poles obstruct traffic no more than lamp
posts or even "footmen, horsemen, carriages and wagons," all of which
obstruct the streets or sidewalks during the time that they are traveling on
them.34
B. Municipal Regulatory Fees
States have always permitted municipalities to regulate the use of
the streets and to recover the costs of that regulation from the regulated
entities.35 Municipal regulatory fees, however, have generally been
limited to regulatory costs. 36 As early as the 1880s, the United States
circuit courts of appeals were striking down municipal wireline
29. Hodges v. W. Union Tel. Co., 18 So. 84, 85 (Miss. 1895) (quoting Clinton, 24
Iowa 455).
30. See, e.g., People v. Kerr, 27 N.Y. 188, 212 (1863). There is serious question as
well whether a municipality may sell its streets to the general public for a profit. See,
e.g., Lerch v. Short, 185 N.W. 129 (Iowa 1921); Ransom v. Boal, 29 Iowa 68 (1870);
Town of Chouteau v. Blankenship, 152 P.2d 379, 383 (Okla. 1944). And courts have
held that streets are required to be reserved for public purposes and may not be
transferred to another for a "non-public" purpose. Sears v. City of Chicago, 93 N.E. 158
(I11. 910); Glasgow v. City of St. Louis, 87 Mo. 678 (1885); Embury v. Conner, 3 N.Y.
511 (1850); In re John & Cherry Streets, 19 Wend. 659 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839).
31. Julia Bldg. Ass'n v. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258, 272 (1885) (quoting Belcher
Sugar Ref. Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 82 Mo. 121 (1884)).
32. City of St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 10 S.W. 197 (Mo. 1888); see City of
Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., 59 N.E. at 785.
33. Julia Bldg. Ass', 88 Mo. at 269 ("[T]o the extent of the number of
communications daily transmitted by [the telephone company], the street would be
relieved of that number of footmen, horsemen or carriages.").
34. Id.
35. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 29 A. 819 (Md. 1894), affd, 156
U.S. 210 (1895); Hodges v. W. Union Tel. Co., 18 So. 84, 85 (Miss. 1895).
36. Postal Tel-Cable Co. v. Borough of Taylor, 192 U.S. 64 (1904); W. Union Tel.
Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 187 U.S. 419 (1903); W. Union Tel. Co. v. City of
Philadelphia, 12 A. 142 (Pa. 1888); 9 EUGENE McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 26.17 (3d ed. 1995).
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regulatory fees on the ground that they were higher than the cost of
regulation and excessive as a matter of law.37
Although the courts have differed at the margins of what they
consider to be appropriate "regulatory costs," at their core the cases are
largely consistent. Legitimate regulation expenses may be charged,
including the cost of permitting and policing compliance with
regulations.38 Fees may be used to reduce congestion and to limit
activities that the municipality may legitimately restrict. 39 Some courts
have suggested that regulatory fees may also include repair costs and
some portion of street maintenance expenses.40 A municipality may not,
41however, use a regulatory fee for the purpose of raising revenues.
In most cases the question whether fees are excessive in light of the
regulatory purpose has been for a jury to decide. But where the courts
have felt that the fee is "clearly" above regulatory costs, they have not
hesitated to strike it down as excessive as a matter of law.43 "[I]f it were
37. See City of Philadelphia v. W. Union Tel. Co., 40 F. 615 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1889);
City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 39 F. 59 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1889), rev'd, 148 U.S. 92
(1893); cf. City of Saginaw v. Swift Elec. Light Co., 72 N.W. 6 (Mich. 1897).
38. See, e.g., At. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 166-67
(1903). A municipality may recover "the necessary expenses of issuing [the license], and
the additional labor of officers and other expenses thereby incurred." Id. (quoting City of
Philadelphia v. W. Union Tel. Co., 89 F. 454, 461 (3d Cir. 1898)).
39. See Diginet, Inc. v. W. Union A.T.S., Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1399 (7th Cir. 1992);
Chicago Gen. Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago, 52 N.E. 880, 881 (I11. 898) (stating that a fee
was justifiable because rails of street railways in streets were a "serious annoyance").
Regulatory fees may also be used to discourage undesirable conduct. See, e.g., Gundling
v. City of Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900); San Juan Cellular Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 967 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1992); Fylken v. City of Minot, 264 N.W. 728 (N.D.
1936). The Supreme Court has suggested in dicta, however, that assessments intended to
discourage an activity "are in the nature of 'taxes."' Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v.
United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974); see infra notes 113-37 and accompanying text
(discussing taxes).
40. See City of Memphis v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 145 F. 602, 606 (6th Cir. 1906);
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 620 N.E.2d 1040, 1046 (I11. 1993).
But see Bryant v. Vill. of Sherman, 561 N.E.2d 1320, 1324 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (holding
that no fee permitted for cost of maintenance of street); Boston Gas Co. v. City of
Newton, 682 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (Mass. 1997) (finding that ordinance requiring fees to
recover reduction in useful life of streets from street excavations preempted by state law
giving utility responsibility for restoring street).
41. See, e.g., Alstadt v. Ark.-Mo. Power Co., 219 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Ark. 1949); City
of Chicago Heights v. W. Union Tel. Co., 94 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Ill. 1950); see also
Merrelli v. City of St. Clair Shores, 96 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Mich. 1959).
42. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 187 U.S. 419, 420-21
(1903) (finding that whether annual fees of $1 per pole and $2.50 per mile of wire were
reasonable left to jury); In re Petition of Del. & At. Tel. Co., 73 A. 175 (Pa. 1909); City
of Allentown v. W. Union Tel. Co., 23 A. 1070 (Pa. 1892) (per curiam) (finding that
annual fee of $2.50 per pole not so clearly excessive as to justify taking from jury).
43. See, e.g., Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Borough of Taylor, 192 U.S. 64 (1904)
(striking down as excessive fee twenty times higher than costs); City of Philadelphia v.
W. Union Tel. Co., 40 F. 615 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1889) (finding that fee five times the cost of
[Vol. 107:2
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possible to prove in advance the exact cost, that sum would be the limit
of the law." 4 But in the absence of such information, the municipality
need not demonstrate that the fees are a precise match, either with past or
projected expenses.45 And most courts have placed the burden of
persuasion on the wireline company to prove that the fee is not a
reasonable approximation of the costs of regulation. 6 Nevertheless, the
expenses must be "reasonably anticipated, ', 7 and at least one court has
required the municipality to demonstrate with factual studies or statistics
48how the fee is related to expenses.
These general requirements for wireline regulatory fees were well
established by the early 1890s, and have been applied since that time.49
But the question whether a fee is in fact a "regulatory fee" or something
else has bedeviled courts dealing with municipal wireline fees. In the
1893 case of City of St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co. ("St.
Louis /,),50 the Supreme Court changed the nomenclature for considering
municipal wireline fees in a way that created confusion for the next
century and beyond.
C. The City of St. Louis Cases and the Concept of "Street Rentals"
St. Louis I was the first case to reach the Supreme Court involving
challenges to municipal charges for allowing telegraph and telephone
companies to place poles and wires in the public rights-of-way. The City
of St. Louis had imposed an annual charge of $5 for each pole Western
Union placed in the city streets. 51 The total amount of the fee to Western
Union annually was $7,545, more than forty-four percent of the assessed
valuation of Western Union's property in the City.52 By the time the
regulation clearly excessive); City of Saginaw v. Swift Elec. Light Co., 72 N.W. 6 (Mich.
1897) (finding that $.50 annual pole fee to cover inspection costs of approximately S.05
per pole was clearly excessive); Wis. Tel. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 104 N.W. 1009,
1013 (Wis. 1905) (finding it "quite obvious" that $1 annual pole fee would be "far
beyond the reasonable expense of such inspection and supervision").
44. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Borough of Taylor, 192 U.S. at 70.
45. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 187 U.S. at 425-26;
Borough of Gettysburg v. Gettysburg Transit Co., 36 Pa. Super. 598 (1908).
46. See, e.g., Atl. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 165 (1903).
But see T.C.G.N.Y., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d 81, 97, 99 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
47. See, e.g., Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Borough of Taylor, 192 U.S. at 70; Atl. & Pac.
Tel. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 190 U.S. at 164-65.
48. N.Y. Tel. Co. v. City of Amsterdam, 613 N.Y.S.2d 993, 995 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994); 9 MCQUILLAN, supra note 36, § 26.36, at 112.
49. See sources cited supra notes 36-41; infra notes 75-99 and accompanying text.
50. 148 U.S. 92 (1893) [hereinafter St. Louis I], reh'g denied, 149 U.S. 465 (1893)
[hereinafter St. Louis I1].
51. SeeSt. LouisI, 148U.S. at93.
52. Statement, Brief & Argument for Defendant in Error at 39, St. Louis I, 148 U.S.
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matter reached the Supreme Court, state and lower federal courts had
already struck down, as excessive regulatory fees, similar municipal
efforts to impose annual charges for the placement of utility poles. 53 In
St. Louis 1, the circuit court below had expressed its belief that it was
"obvious... that the ordinance cannot be upheld under the power
conferred on the municipality 'to regulate' telegraph companies. 54
But, in a surprising opinion by Justice Brewer, the Supreme Court
went off in an unexpected direction. Reversing the decision of the lower
court and remanding for a new trial, the Court suggested that the charge
was "in the nature of rental. 55  The Court analogized to the City's
leasing rooms in an. old city hall and declared: "The city has attempted
to make the telegraph company pay for appropriating to its own and sole
use a part of the streets and public places of the city. It is seeking to
collect rent."
56
Justice Brewer's reliance on a rental theory in considering St.
Louis's pole fees was a bolt out of the blue. Neither the City nor
Western Union had mentioned any rental theory in their briefs to the
Court.57 And no lower court cases had engaged in such an analysis. So
far as reflected in the reported decisions, this was the first case at any
level suggesting that municipalities could charge rent for a wireline
company's placement of facilities in the public rights-of-way.
The St. Louis I Court focused on the potentially catastrophic impact
of telegraph and telephone infrastructure on the public streets. At that
time in the growth of the telegraph and telephone industries, it was not
clear to what extent the burgeoning infrastructure might overwhelm the
thoroughfares in major cities. An 1888 Pennsylvania case had noted the
potential for utility poles to clutter the streets with so many obstructions
as virtually to eliminate the public's ability to use the streets for normal
pedestrian and vehicular traffic. 58  "By sufficient multiplication of
92 (No. 94).
53. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. W. Union Tel. Co., 40 F. 615 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1889); City of Allentown v. W. Union Tel. Co., 23 A. 1070 (Pa. 1892).
54. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 39 F. 59, 60 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1889), rev'd,
148 U.S. 92 (1893) (emphasis added). The court below had held that the $5 per pole
charge was a "tax," unauthorized under state law. For a discussion of whether a charge
amounts to a "tax," see infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
55. The Court stated that the charge was for "the giving of the exclusive use of real
estate, for which the giver has a right to exact compensation, which is in the nature of
rental." St. Louis I, 148 U.S. at 99.
56. Id. at 98.
57. See Abstract of the Record, St. Louis 1, 148 U.S. 92 (No. 94); Statement of
Assignment of Errors, St. Louis 1, 148 U.S. 92 (No. 94); Argument and Brief for Plaintiff
in Error, St. Louis 1, 148 U.S. 92 (No. 94); Statement, Brief & Argument for Defendant in
Error, St. Louis 1, 148 U.S. 92 (No. 94).
58. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
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telegraph and telephone companies," mused the St. Louis I Court, "the
whole space of the highway might be occupied... ,59 The Court also
focused on the inability of municipalities to limit the use of the streets for
telegraph poles under a congressional enactment in 1866, which
authorized telegraph companies to occupy all "post roads., 60  All the
streets in St. Louis were "post roads" under the law, 61 and thus the City
could not prevent telegraph companies from placing their poles within
them.
The Court buttressed its "rental" analysis by observing that the
federal government could not deprive the state of its property without
"just compensation. ''62 "[T]he state," said the Court, "may exact from
the party or corporation given such exclusive use pecuniary
compensation to the general public for being deprived of the common
use of the portion thus appropriated.,
63
The Court did not address the nature of the City's property rights,
and did not acknowledge or dispute the historical consensus that
municipalities did not hold a proprietary interest in their streets. 64 Nor
did the Court address the level of compensation that would be
appropriate, noting that the latter question would be a proper subject for
a later trial on remand. 65 At the trial later held on this issue, the trial
court struck down the $5 charge, and the Supreme Court ultimately
sustained that decision.
66
The significance of the Court's first-of-its-kind "rental" analysis
was almost immediately thrown into doubt. The Court issued a second
67
opinion, on rehearing, two months after the first opinion. Western
The streets are already lined with masts sustaining an intricate web of wires,
actually or potentially charged with an electric current .... [N]o argument is
.requisite to show the inconvenience that might result if the number could be
indefinitely increased .... [M]uch as they have multiplied in the past, we may
believe that in the near future they will be still more numerous.
W. Union Tel. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 12 A. 144, 145 (Pa. 1888). Photographs from
the era show hundreds of wires crisscrossing the streets. See EDWIN S. GROSVENOR &
MORGAN WESSON, ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL 120, 172 (1997).
59. St. Louis 1, 148 U.S. at 99.
60. Act of July 24, 1886, ch. 230, 14 Stat. 221 (providing for aid in the construction
of telegraph lines and for securing government use of the same for postal, military, and
other purposes).
61. St. Louis 1, 148 U.S. at 100.
62. Id. at 101. The Court failed to note that just compensation principles would
afford the City only nominal compensation for Western Union's use, in any case. See
infra text accompanying notes 184-93.
63. St. Louis 1, 148 U.S. at 101-02.
64. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
65. St. Louis 1, 148 U.S. at 104.
66. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 166 U.S. 388 (1897) [hereinafter St.
Louis III].
67. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465 (1893) [hereinafter St.
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Union argued on rehearing that the City did not have the authority
delegated by the state of Missouri that the Court necessarily assumed in
its first opinion. Although disavowing any change in the "views
expressed as to the power of the city of St. Louis in this matter," 68 the
Court apparently agreed that St. Louis had no legislative or constitutional
authority to charge a "rental" for its rights-of-way.
The St. Louis II Court was forced to ground the City's authority to
impose the charges in the permission given in its charter to "regulate...
telegraph companies., 69  "[T]he power to require payment of some
reasonable sum for the exclusive use of a portion of the streets," said the
Court, "was within the grant of power to regulate the use.",70 Moreover,
"[t]he determination of the amount to be paid for the use is as much a
matter of regulation as determining the place which may be used or the
size or height of the poles.",7' The Court used the words "regulate" or
"regulation" fourteen times in the seven-page opinion. It did not once
mention "rent" or "rental" or any similar concept. Failing to find any
authority for municipal "rental" of the streets, therefore, the Court
effectively reduced the discussion of the concept in its earlier opinion to
dicta.
Abandoning the concept of "rent" in St. Louis II, the Court focused,
instead, on the right of the City, under its delegated regulatory powers, to
impose a regulatory charge for Western Union's "use" of the streets.
Without clearly articulating the concept as such, the Court's analysis in
St. Louis, H has the flavor of the modem economic theory of
"congestion" costs. If congestion occurs, it imposes a cost on all users.
It is appropriate to permit a regulatory charge (or toll) that recognizes
72that cost and acts to reduce overuse. In the Court's view, Western
Union was potentially obstructing the free use of the streets by others. It
Louis II].
68. Id. at 467.
69. Id. at 468. Although the charter as originally granted gave the power "to license,
tax, and regulate... telegraph companies," the power to tax had been repealed. Mo.
REV. STAT. § 6901 (1879).
70. St. Louis I, 149 U.S. at 470. "And so it is only a matter of regulation of use
when the city grants to the telegraph company the right to use exclusively a portion of the
street, on condition of contributing something towards the expense it has been to in
opening and improving the street." Id.
71. Id.at471.
72. See, e.g., Diginet, Inc. v. W. Union A.T.S., Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1398-99 (7th
Cir. 1992) (noting that "[c]ongestion is the obvious problem calling for regulation,
whether it is traffic congestion or a crowded utilities duct" and that "[r]egulation to solve
such problems can take the form of user fees reasonably calculated to cover the cost that
a given use of the public way imposes on either the municipality or the other users of the
public way"); see also 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES
AND INSTITUTIONs 87-89 (1993) (discussing use of tolls to reduce congestion).
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was within the regulatory power of the municipality to impose a charge
to recognize the possible cost of Western Union's use on other right-of-
way users and to impose a charge on Western Union's use to that degree.
By avoiding further discussion of "rentals," and by returning to the
traditional concept of "regulation," the Court brought the analysis back
to settled principles of municipal law. As noted earlier, the established
common law made clear that municipalities had no "proprietary" interest
in their streets,73 and had no inherent power to rent them.74 If anything
remained of the concept in St Louis I that municipal fees for a wireline
company's placing poles and wires in the public rights-of-way were "in
the nature of rental," it was only as a diluted proxy for fees based on
regulatory costs.
In the twenty-five years that followed St. Louis I, the Supreme
Court heard ten more cases involving municipal charges on poles in the
public streets. 7 In several of these cases, the Court referred to a "rental"
theory,76 but never did the Court determine whether a charge was
reasonable on that ground. Indeed, since St. Louis 1, the Court has never
analyzed the reasonableness of a municipal wireline charge on the basis
73. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text. To the extent that municipalities
have only an easement in streets, which is commonly the case, there is nothing to "rent"
under any theory. 2 SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTlEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
§ 30.09 (2d ed. 1998) ("When a local government has an easement... there is nothing
available for the local government to sell to anyone.").
74. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text; see also STEVENSON, supra note
73, § 24.12[6] ("Local governments must have clear authority [from the state] to lease or
rent governmental properties.").
75. See Mackay Tel. & Cable Co. v. City of Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94 (1919) (finding
no support in record for argument that $.50 per-pole license tax was unreasonable); Postal
Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919) (finding $2 per-pole fee not
excessive regulatory cost); Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464
(1918) (involving res judicata issue); W. Union Tel. Co. v. City of Richmond, 224 U.S.
160 (1912) (finding $2 per-pole charge not proved to be unreasonable based solely on
claims brought under federal constitutional and statutory provisions); Postal Tel.-Cable
Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 192 U.S. 55 (1904) (finding no error for jury to find that
$1 per-pole charge was unreasonable, but finding error for jury to determine what a
reasonable fee would be); Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Borough of Taylor, 192 U.S. 64
(1904) (finding $1 per-pole charge was twenty times the cost of regulation and was
unreasonable); Adl. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160 (1903) (finding
sufficient evidence to uphold a $1 per-pole charge as reasonable); W. Union Tel. Co. v.
Borough of New Hope, 187 U.S. 419 (1903) (upholding $1 annual per-pole charge as
prima facie reasonable in light of cost of regulation); City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel.
Co., 166 U.S. 388 (1897) (upholding lower court's finding in favor of Western Union
regarding the $5 per-pole fee discussed in St. Louis I and St Louis 11); Postal Tel.-Cable
Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 156 U.S. 210 (1895) (affirming lower court's decision
upholding $2 per-pole annual charge on authority of St. Louis 1).
76. W. Union Tel. Co. v. City of Richmond, 224 U.S. at 170; Postal Tel.-Cable Co.




of whether it constitutes a permissible or reasonable "rental" of a portion
of the rights-of-way.
Instead, when considering the reasonableness of municipal wireline
fees, the Court has steadfastly relied on the traditional analysis: Is the
fee justified by regulatory costs? Municipal fees of $1 per pole and
$2.50 per mile of wire were upheld as prima facie reasonable in view of
the cost of regulation in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Borough of
New Hope77 and Atlantic & Pacific Telegraph Co. v. City of
Philadelphia.78 In the latter case, the Court determined that the fee was
not in the nature of rental.79 On the other hand, the Court reversed the
lower court's approval of similar fees of $1 per-pole and $2.50 per mile
of wire as reasonable regulatory costs in Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v.
Borough of Taylor.8°  In Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of
Richmond,81 the Court agreed that a $2 per-pole fee was not excessive
considering the cost of "looking after the many poles... part of which,
at least, carried many wires.
82
.Numerous state and lower federal courts, since St. Louis 1, have
rejected arguments that municipal telecommunications fees should be
upheld as "rentals" of the public rights-of-way. 83 In 1895 the Mississippi
Supreme Court held that the municipality's fee interest in its streets was
maintained in trust for the public and the municipality was not entitled to
charge rent from a telegraph company for the use of those streets.84
Similar decisions were reached in Ohio,
85 Iowa,86 Wisconsin 87
77. 187 U.S. 419 (1903).
78. 190 U.S. 160 (1903).
79. Id. at 164.
80. 192 U.S. 64 (1904) (holding telegraph company entitled to judgment because
fees exceeded by twenty times the cost of regulation).
81. 249 U.S. 252 (1919).
82. Id. at 260.
83. City of Tulsa v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 75 F.2d 343, 353 (10th Cir. 1935);
Vill. of Lombard v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 90 N.E.2d 105 (Ill. 1950); City of Des Moines v.
Iowa Tel. Co., 162 N.W. 323, 327 (Iowa 1917); Hodges v. W. Union Tel. Co., 18 So. 84,
85 (Miss. 1895) (quoting City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa
455 (1868)); Sch. Dist. of McCook v. City of McCook, 81 N.W.2d 224, 227 (Neb. 1957);
City of Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., 59 N.E. 781, 785 (Ohio 1901);
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. City of Morgantown, 105 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1958);
Wis. Tel. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 104 N.W. 1009, 1013 (Wis. 1905).
84. Hodges v. W. Union Tel. Co., 18 So. at 85 (quoting City of Clinton v. Cedar
Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455).
85. City of Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., 59 N.E. at 785 (holding
municipal corporation has "no private proprietary right or interest in [the streets] which
entitles it to compensation, under the constitution, when they are subjected to an
authorized additional burden").
86. City of Des Moines v. Iowa Tel. Co., 162 N.W. at 27 (finding corporation acting
in "public business" cannot be required to pay "rental" value for use of streets).
87. Wis. Tel. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 104 N.W. at 1013 (finding $1 per pole
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Nebraska, 8 Oklahoma,89 Illinois,90 and West Virginia.91 Courts that
have upheld municipal wireline fees have generally found the fees to be
justified by regulatory costs.
92
Only a very few cases actually have upheld municipal wireline fees
as authorized "rentals" of the streets, and these cases are poorly
reasoned. 93 Judge Dillon, writing in 1911, questioned whether the Court
in St. Louis I could really have meant to base its analysis on the
municipality's right to charge compensation for the use of the streets, as
opposed to the regulatory basis clearly underlying St. Louis 1J.94 The
idea that municipal fees could be justified as rentals of the streets,
stillborn in St. Louis I, was never viable.
But the St. Louis I "rental" analysis left a continuing legacy of
confusion. 95 Courts occasionally referred to municipal fees as street
annual charge would be "far beyond the reasonable expense of such inspection and
supervision").
88. Sch. Dist. of McCook v. City of McCook, 81 N.W.2d at 227 (holding city has no
right to rent or charge a toll for the use of the public streets).
89. City of Tulsa v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 75 F.2d 343, 356 (10th Cir. 1935)
(holding city has no power to charge compensation for use of its streets).
90. Vill. of Lombard v. I11. Bell Tel. Co., 90 N.E.2d 105, 109-10 (I1. 1950) (holding
rental implies an ability to exclude those for whom the streets are held in trust, which is
not authorized).
91. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. City of Morgantown, 105 S.E.2d 260, 269-70
(W. Va. 1958) (holding that there exists no power in municipality to lease streets or
collect rental).
92. City of Memphis v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 145 F. 602, 606 (6th Cir. 1906)
(upholding $3 per-pole charge as reasonable proportion of the cost of making and
keeping in repair and policing streets); Alstadt v. Ark.-Mo. Power Co., 219 S.W.2d 938,
940 (Ark. 1949) (holding pole fee of $. 10 per month was not void on its face as excessive
regulatory fee).
93. See City of Pensacola v. S. Bell Tel. Co., 37 So. 820, 823 (Fla. 1905)
(recognizing that St. Louis I derived city's power from power to "regulate" the use of
streets, but justifying fee as rental); City of Springfield v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 97 N.E.
672, 674 (Ill. 1912) (refusing to authorize rental fees, as explained in Village of Lombard
v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 90 N.E.2d 105, 110 (Ill. 1950)); Fleming v. Houston
Lighting & Power Co., 138 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. 1940) (permitting rental fee on
authority of Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. City of Dallas, 174 S.W. 636
(Tex. Civ. App. 1915)).
94. DILLON, supra note 16, § 1275 n.3.
But the doubt may be suggested whether the pole tax in question in this case
[St. Louis I] must not rest for its validity upon the police power or upon some
ground other than that the city under its general powers over or concerning
streets had the right ... to exact this pole tax or charge as a return or
compensation for the use of the streets of the city.... We think the court did
not hold or intend to hold.., that.., the city had any ownership of the streets
of private or proprietary rights therein which were beyond legislative regulation
and control.
Id.
95. See, e.g., City of Peoria v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 113 N.E. 968 (Ill. 1916)
(illustrating the confusion between regulatory fees and rentals); Southwestern Tel. & Tel.
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96 97rental payments, and dredged up the concept in a variety of contexts.
Although several recent cases have dismissed the theory of street rentals
as "outdated," 98 as will be seen in the later discussion of decisions
interpreting section 253 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the
concept that municipalities may charge "rent" for use of their streets has
never been fully discarded.99
D. Municipal Franchise Fees
Since the rejection by most courts of municipal pole fees as a
method of raising municipal revenues, many municipalities have turned
to franchise fees as their preferred method of exacting revenues from
wireline companies. Today, municipalities typically take five percent of
gross revenues from cable operators as franchise fees, 00 and are
increasingly attempting to force similar fees on telecommunications
companies. 101 Franchise fees, unlike regulatory fees, represent a charge
for the franchisee's receipt of some special "privilege" from the
Co. v. City of Dallas, 174 S.W. 636 (same).
96. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. FCC, 118 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating, in
ruling on FCC interpretation of franchise fees, that they are "essentially a form of rent:
the price paid to rent use of public right-of-ways"); Telesat Cablevision, Inc. v. City of
Riviera Beach, 773 F. Supp. 383, 407 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (using "rental" terminology in
discussing franchise fee); Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp 580, 594
(W.D. Pa. 1987) (using term "rent" but recognizing that city may not have a "possessory
interest in the public streets"); City of Little Rock v. AT&T Communications of the
Southwest, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Ark. 1994) ("In common parlance, such franchise
fees are, in form, rental payments for a public utility's use of the municipality's right-of-
way .... ").
97. See, e.g., Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d
1081, 1092-93 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (treating payment as rent for purposes of Tax Injunction
Act); City of Philadelphia v. Holmes Elec. Protective Co., 6 A.2d 884, 887 (Pa. 1939)
(treating payment as "rent" for purposes of applying municipal immunity doctrine).
98. City of Chattanooga v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 809 n.3 (E.D.
Tenn. 1998); Alachua County v. State, 737 So. 2d 1065, 1068 n.1 (Fla. 1999).
99. See infra notes 138-219 and accompanying text. Indeed, some commentators,
without analyzing the true basis for the theory, continue to call for increased "rental
charges" on wireline companies. See, e.g., Clarence A. West, The Information Highway
Must Pay Its Way Through Cities: A Discussion of the Authority of State and Local
Governments To Be Compensated for the Use of Public Rights-of-Way, 1 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 29 (1995); Roger D. Colton & Michael F. Sheehan, Raising
Local Government Revenue Through Utility Franchise Charges: If the Fee Fits, Foot It,
21 URB. LAW. 55, 73 (1989).
100. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat.
2779, limits franchise fees for operation of the cable system in the community to no more
than "5-percent of [the] cable operator's gross revenues derived ... from the operation of
the cable system to provide cable services." 47 U.S.C. § 542(b); see infra notes 227-34
and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 138-217 and accompanying text.
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municipality. 10 2 In theory, at least, a municipal franchise fee represents a
bargained-for exchange by the franchisee for the right to use municipal
rights-of-way that could otherwise be denied to it.1
0 3
Franchises are deemed to be contracts between the municipality and
the franchisee.' °4 Because franchise fees are part of agreements between
the municipality and the franchisee, courts have been reluctant to allow
wireline companies to attack the fees during the term of the franchise.
"[E]xactions agreed to... are not exactions.' 0 5 To complain about the
amount of a franchise fee, therefore, wireline companies have generally
been required to contest the amount before agreeing to it.'0 6 Yet, for a
wireline company to obtain access to the municipal rights-of-way in the
first place, it has typically had no choice but to agree to the fee.
As with other municipal powers, the authority of a municipality to
exact franchise fees must be derived directly from the legislature or the
state constitution.'0 7 Where authorized by state statute or covered within
their home rule powers, municipalities have been able to demand large
fees under franchises, sometimes even auctioning off franchises to the
highest bidders.10 8  These municipalities have been able to use "their
102. The term "franchise" is defined generally as "a special privilege granted by the
government to particular individuals or companies to be exploited for private profits."
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804 n.5 (S.C. 1999); see
also Greene Line Terminal Co. v. Martin, 10 S.E.2d 901, 903 (W. Va. 1940).
103. See, e.g., Alachua County, 737 So. 2d at 1068.
104. See, e.g., City of Calhoun v. N. Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 443 S.E.2d 469,
471 (Ga. 1994); City of North Las Vegas v. Cent. Tel. Co., 460 P.2d 835, 836 (Nev.
1969); 12 MCQUILLIN, supra note 36, § 34.06.
105. I11. Broad. Co. v. City of Decatur, 238 N.E.2d 261, 265 (I11. App. Ct. 1968).
106. See, e.g., City of Hartford v. Conn. Co., 140 A. 734, 744 (Conn. 1928); MCI
Metro Access Transmission Serv., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 941 S.W.2d 634, 639 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1997). Where a statute reflects a congressional desire to impose limits on
existing franchises, however, courts will not consider those limits to have been waived.
See id.
107. See, e.g., McPhee & McGinnity Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 158 F. 5, 10 (8th
Cir. 1907); Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 282 P.2d 36, 41 (Cal. 1955);
Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 795 P.2d 298 (Idaho 1990); Vill. of Lombard v. I11. Bell Tel.
Co., 90 N.E.2d 105, 108 (I11. 1950) (holding that municipal corporation has no "inherent
power to ... exact a payment for a privilege"); Cmty. Antenna Television of Wichita,
Inc. v. City of Wichita, 471 P.2d 360, 366 (Kan. 1970) (holding that municipality had no
authority to demand franchise fee); KAOK-CATV, Inc. v. La. Cable T.V., Inc., 195 So.
2d 297 (La. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that municipality had no authority to require cable
operator to obtain franchise); Nugent v. City of East Providence, 238 A.2d 758 (R.I.
1968) (same); City of Abbeville v. Aiken Elec. Coop., Inc., 338 S.E.2d 831, 835 (S.C.
1985) (holding that power to franchise is an attribute of state power delegated to
municipalities by statute); 12 MCQUILLIN, supra note 36, § 34.14 ("It is undisputed that a
municipal corporation has no inherent power to grant a franchise or license to use the
streets and that its authority is limited to that conferred upon it expressly or by
implication by the state constitution or the legislature.").
108. See, e.g., Tulare County v. City of Dinuba, 206 P. 983 (Cal. 1922); 12
McQUILLN, supra note 36, § 34.31.
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locational monopolies to ... extort monopolistic fees from companies
that must frequently run wires and cables across local governmental
boundaries."' 09
But new government policies favoring local competition in
telecommunications and cable television have completely undercut the
traditional municipal franchise paradigm. 10  Today, the idea that
municipal wireline franchises embody a government "privilege" has been
preempted by federal laws that severely limit municipalities' ability to
deny access to their rights-of-way. The Telecommunications Act of
1996 prohibits municipalities from preventing telecommunications
companies from providing "any interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service." '' The 1984 Cable Communications
Policy Act, as amended, limits municipal ability to refuse franchises to
cable operators." 2  No longer may it fairly be said that, in allowing
telecommunications providers and cable operators to place their facilities
in city streets, municipalities are providing any special "privileges." The
municipalities are now simply complying with federal law.
The preemption of municipal ability to exclude wireline companies
from the public rights-of-way fundamentally affects municipal leverage
to extract franchise fees from wireline companies. Only if the
municipality has the authority under state law to impose a wireline tax
can it realistically expect to be able to force wireline companies to accept
franchise fees greater than regulatory costs.
E. Municipal "Taxes"
Seldom, however, can municipal wireline fees be justified under
state law as "taxes." In fact, designation as a tax has doomed many a
municipal fee. Municipalities have no inherent power to tax, and the
power to exact taxes from wireline companies must be found in
constitutional or legislative provisions.' 13 Numerous cases have rejected
109. Diginet, Inc. v. W. Union A.T.S., Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1397 (7th Cir. 1992).
Although Judge Posner, who wrote the decision, was specifically referring to a
municipality's imposition of fees on a telecommunications provider's use of the public
rights-of-way for wires that were not directly used to provide any services in the
community, his wording applies equally to the traditional power of municipalities in
demanding high fees in franchise negotiations. Cf id.
110. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
Transformation of RegulatedIndustries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323 (1998).
111. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2002).
112. Id. §§ 541, 546; see infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. City of Morgantown, 105 S.E.2d
260, 269 (W. Va. 1958); Radiofone, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 630 So. 2d 694, 697
(La. 1994); 16 McQuILLIN, supra note 36, § 44.05.
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as unauthorized taxes wireline fees that exceed the cost of regulation." 4
As early as 1889, a United States circuit court held that a municipal
charge more than five times the cost of regulation, though labeled a "fee"
by the municipality, was an unauthorized tax.
1 15
In describing the difference between regulatory fees and taxes,
courts have noted that a "classic tax" is found where a revenue-
generating measure is imposed by the legislature on many of its citizens.
Tax revenues typically go into the general fund to be used for any
purpose. A "classic fee" is imposed on a limited class of people and is
intended to have a clear regulatory purpose, such as discouraging certain
conduct or defraying the cost of regulation.'1 6 Courts have also noted
that fees generally are imposed on parties that receive some benefit from
the regulatory regime or have some choice in whether to engage in the
activity that is the subject of the fee.
117
Courts that have ventured into this thicket when evaluating
municipal right-of-way fees have often struggled. On the one hand;
right-of-way fees that exceed regulatory costs meet some of the central
criteria for a tax. They are typically imposed by legislative ordinance;
they are intended to be revenue-generating; and the amounts collected
typically are placed in the general fund. But, on the other hand, the fees
are imposed by the municipality on only a very small group, and the
group obtains the arguable benefit of being able to use the public rights-
of-way. In trying to place the municipal exactions at the correct point on
the continuum between fees and taxes, many courts have been influenced
primarily by whether the imposts are intended to generate revenue and
whether the amounts collected are destined for the municipal general
fund." 8 Some courts have found right-of-way fees to be taxes solely
because they have a clear purpose to generate revenue in excess of
regulatory costs." 19
Courts have sometimes loosely characterized fees as "taxes" in a
114. See, e.g., Vill. of Lombard v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 90 N.E.2d 105 (Ill. 1950); N.Y.
Tel. Co. v. City of Amsterdam, 613 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1994); Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 105 S.E.2d 260.
115. City of Philadelphia v. W. Union Tel. Co., 40 F. 615 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1889).
116. San Juan Cellular Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 967 F.2d 683, 685 (1st Cir.
1992).
117. See, e.g., Boston Gas Co. v. City of Newton, 682 N.E.2d 1336, 1343 n.19 (Mass.
1997); N.Y. Tel. Co. v. City of Amsterdam, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 995; BellSouth Telecomms.,
Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804, 806 (S.C. 1999).
118. See, e.g., Robinson Protective Alarm Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 581 F.2d 371,
376 (3d Cir. 1978); N.Y. Tel. Co. v. City of Amsterdam, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 995-96; see
also Merrelli v. City of St. Clair Shores, 96 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Mich. 1959).
119. See, e.g., Radiofone, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 630 So. 2d 694 (La. 1994);
Kent County Water Auth. v. State Dep't of Health, 723 A.2d 1132 (R.I. 1999);
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 105 S.E.2d 260.
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sort of shorthand, without engaging in any analysis.' 20 For example, in
an interesting allusion to the statement in St. Louis I that the pole fees at
issue were "in the nature of rental,"'12 1 the New York Supreme Court
found in 1979 that a gross revenue fee imposed on cable television
companies was "in the nature of' a tax.122  The New York court
contrasted the measure-"essentially a measure of the value of the
franchise ... intended to produce revenue"-to a "modest, flat fee
intended to defray the cost of licensing."
' 123
For reasons that are obscure, courts have gone out of their way to
characterize municipal fees that are revenue-generating and clearly
greater than regulatory costs as unauthorized taxes, rather than simply as
excessive regulatory fees. Under either designation, the fees are
impermissible, 124 and whether a fee is labeled a "tax" as well as an
excessive regulatory fee should be irrelevant to a court's analysis.
Especially where there is no argument presented that the municipality
has authority to impose taxes on the use of its streets, calling the
excessive fee an unauthorized tax adds nothing meaningful to the
analysis.
In cases in which it has been important to determine whether a
municipal wireline fee exceeding the cost of regulation is actually a tax,
the weight of authority has favored an affirmative determination.
Assuming that the fee (1) clearly exceeds regulatory costs, (2) is
deposited in the general fund, and (3) has not been accepted by the
wireline company as a franchise fee, it will generally be considered to be
a tax. Only if state law explicitly permits the municipality to impose
such a tax, therefore, will it be permissible.
A determination that a municipal wireline fee is a tax, rather than
simply an excessive regulatory fee, can be more than semantics in at
least one important context. The Federal Tax Injunction Act of 1937125
120. See, e.g., Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 794 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
121. The Supreme Court said that the pole fee, in that case, was "in the nature of
rental." City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 99 (1893) [hereinafter St.
Louis 1], reh'g denied, 149 U.S. 465 (1893) [hereinafter St. Louis 11]; see supra notes 51-
64 and accompanying text.
122. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. v. City of New York, 420 N.Y.S.2d 544,
546 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
123. Id.
124. Wireline fees have often been found impermissible as excessive regulatory fees,
without any consideration whether they are also impermissible taxes. See, e.g., Postal
Tel.-Cable Co. v. Borough of Taylor, 192 U.S. 64 (1904); City of Saginaw v. Swift Elec.
Light Co., 72 N.W. 6 (Mich. 1897); Fylken v. City of Minot, 264 N.W. 728 (N.D. 1936).
125. The Tax Injunction Act provides that "the district courts shall not enjoin,
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. §
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deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to order injunctive or declaratory
relief from state taxes. Federal courts considering whether wireline fees
are unauthorized taxes have found themselves trapped by the traditional
analysis. One district court initially held that a municipal right-of-way
fee was an excessive tax under state law. Facing an argument by the
municipality on rehearing that the decision was beyond the court's
jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act, the court vacated the decision
and remanded the case to state court.1
26
To avoid the proscriptions of the Tax Injunction Act, courts have
adopted a variety of approaches. A few of these approaches would seem
problematic, at best. Simply ignoring the Act, as some courts apparently
have done,127 plainly is a dubious strategy, and one that certainly is not
available where the issue is raised by one of the parties. Some courts
have suggested, based on the language from St. Louis I discussed
extensively above,1 28 that municipal fees are not taxes, but rather are
rental payments. 129  Other courts have simply bucked the weight of
authority that revenue-generating fees are considered taxes. 
130
In addition, caselaw supports a holding that, where a suit is brought
by the municipality in federal court to collect a tax, the Act does not
apply. 13' But this approach will not permit a wireline company to
remove the case to federal court where a municipality sues in state court
1341 (2002).
126. See City of Chattanooga v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 809 (E.D.
Tenn. 1998); cf Robinson Protective Alarm Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 581 F.2d 371 (3d
Cir. 1978) (holding that, under Tax Injunction Act, federal court had no jurisdiction to
consider municipal fee of five percent of gross revenues on alarm company's use of
streets); Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 794 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(suggesting that FCC's policy of restraint in ruling on cable television franchise fee
disputes would leave issues entirely in state court under Tax Injunction Act).
127. See, e.g., Diginet, Inc. v. W. Union A.T.S., Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1397 (7th Cir.
1992); N.J. Payphone Ass'n v. Town of West New York, 130 F. Supp. 2d 631 (D.N.J.
2001); Bell Ati.-Md., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Md. 1999),
vacated & remanded for consid of state law issues, 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000); PECO
Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, No. 99-4766, 1999 WL 1240941 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
20, 1999). Each of these cases deals with requests for injunctions and/or declaratory
judgments without discussion of the Tax Injunction Act. It is not inconceivable that the
courts dealt with the Tax Injunction Act in other non-reported decisions.
128. See supra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
129. In fact, some of the current confusion about whether a municipal fee is actually
"rent" for use of the streets has been perpetuated in discussions by federal courts
attempting to avoid surrendering jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act. See Qwest
Communications Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092-93 (N.D. Cal.
2001); T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789 (E.D. Mich. 1998),
aft'd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
130. See, e.g., Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d at
1092-93.
131. Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (1999).
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to collect the fee.132 None of these theories warrants further discussion
here.
Two other arguments against application of the Tax Injunction Act
to requests for injunctions and declaratory judgments against municipal
right-of-way fees, however, do deserve analysis. First, if the
municipality is using its power of exclusion from the right-of-way to
force a wireline company to accept terms-including excessive fees-
that are not otherwise clearly authorized, the action should not be
dismissed under the Tax Injunction Act. The District Court for the
Western District of Texas, for example, recognized that actions brought
against municipalities for violations of the Telecommunications Act's
proscription against municipal prohibitions on telecommunications
services 133 do not trigger the Tax Injunction Act, even when issues of
fees/taxes are involved. 34 A similar analysis would argue that the Tax
Injunction Act does not apply when a municipality is attempting to force
a cable operator to accept a franchise requirement to pay excessive fees
as a condition to access the rights-of-way. The Cable Act prevents
municipalities from denying cable franchises on unreasonable bases.1
3 5
Where the issue involves an unlawful denial of access to the rights-of-
way, the Tax Injunction Act should not preclude the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.
It would also seem apparent that, before a district court must give
up jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act to review a municipal fee,
there must be some colorable argument that the municipality has ultimate
authority to impose a tax. The Supreme Court held in reviewing a
"comparable" statutory provision-the Anti-Injunction Act, 36 -that, "if
it is clear that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately
prevail, the central purpose of the Act is inapplicable and... the
132. If the municipality brings the action in state court, the "well-pleaded complaint"
rule may prevent the wireline company from having the case removed to federal court.
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3566 (2d ed. 1984).
133. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2002).
134. See AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Austin, 40 F. Supp.
2d 852, 854-55 (W.D. Tex. 1998), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 2000). The
court must find that the municipal restrictions at issue have "erected a barrier to the
provision of telecommunications services under section 253(a) before ever deciding
whether the fees are nevertheless permissible under the "safe harbor" provisions in
section 253(c). Id.
135. 47 U.S.C. §§ 541(a), 546; see infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
136. 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2002). Similar to the purpose of the Tax Injunction Act, the
Anti-Injunction Act is intended to "withdraw jurisdiction from the state and federal courts
to entertain suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the collection of federal taxes." Enochs
v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5 (1962); see also Schneider Transp.,
Inc. v. Cattanach, 657 F.2d 128, 134 (7th Cir. 1981).
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attempted collection may be enjoined if equity jurisdiction otherwise
exists."' 137 If the municipality cannot make the claim that the challenged
charge is an authorized tax under state law, the court should not be
required to forego the jurisdiction to find that the charge is an excessive
and improper regulatory fee.
III. The Preemptive Effect of Current Federal Statutes
A. Section 253 of the Telecommunications Act
In the words of Judge Richard Posner, "[t]he deregulation
movement in telecommunications makes today more like the day before
yesterday (1903) than like yesterday, the heyday of regulation.' ' 13 8 The
1996 Telecommunications Act rejects the last century's recognition of
the virtues of regulated natural monopolies and makes the furtherance of
telecommunications competition a national policy. 39 Section 253(a) of
the Act limits the ability of state and municipal governments to interfere
with that national policy by adopting a statute, regulation, or other "legal
requirement" that "prohibit[s] or [has] the effect of prohibiting the ability
of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications
service.' 140  In section 253(c), however, Congress provided that
"[n]othing in this section affects the authority of a state or local
government to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and
reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers, on a
competitively neutral and a nondiscriminatory basis, if the compensation
required is publicly disclosed by such government."'
141
The majority view is that section 253(c) creates a form of "safe
harbor" only. 42 These cases treat section 253(c) not as a prohibition,
independent of the prohibition contained in section 253(a), but as
specifying types of conduct that are permissible, regardless of section
253(a). The FCC, the federal agency given responsibility under the Act
for implementation of many of its provisions, has placed its weight
behind this approach. 1
43
137. Enochs, 370 U.S. at 7.
138. Diginet, Inc. v. W. Union A.T.S., Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1398 (7th Cir. 1992).
139. See S. REP. No. 104-23, at 2, 16-17 (1995).
140. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).
141. Id. § 253(c).
142. See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169,
1187 (lth Cir. 2001); City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1170 (9th Cir.
2001), cert. denied sub. nom. City of Tacoma v. Qwest Corp., 122 S. Ct. 809 (2002);
Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm'n, 184 F.3d 88, 99 (1st Cir.
1999).
143. FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR PETITIONS FOR
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Many of the cases under section 253 have involved municipal
ordinances that require telecommunications companies to agree to accept
particular franchise terms, including agreeing to pay specified franchise
fees. 144 These ordinances typically contain harsh penalties, sometimes
criminal, for operating in the municipality without a franchise. And, if
the telecommunications provider obtains a franchise but fails to follow
its terms, again the penalties are often severe, and the franchise can then
be revoked.
A municipal requirement that a telecommunications company enter
into a franchise before constructing its essential infrastructure is itself a
prohibition that clearly triggers section 253(a). A literal reading of
subsection (a) permits no other conclusion. As noted in AT&T
Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas,145 a requirement
that a franchise be granted before a telecommunications company can
provide service is "sufficient proof of the requisite prohibitive effect that
triggers the preemptive force of § 253(a)."'
' 46
RuLING UNDER SECTION 253 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT, FCC 98-295 (1998),
available at http:lwww.fcc.govlBureauslCommonCarrier/PublicNotices/1998/fcc
98295.txt.
144. See, e.g., T.C.G.N.Y., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d 81 (S.D.N.Y
(2000); PECO Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, No. 99-4766, 1999 WL 1240941
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1999); Bell Atl.-Md, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d
805 (D. Md. 1999), vacated and remanded for consid. of state law issues, 212 F.3d 863
(4th Cir. 2000).
145. 52 F. Supp. 2d 763, 770 (N.D. Tex. 1999), vacated as moot, 243 F.3d 928 (5th
Cir. 2001).
146. See Bell Atl.-Md., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 814. In Bell
Atlantic-Maryland, the court stated that:
[A]ny "process for entry" that imposes burdensome requirements on
telecommunications companies and vests significant discretion in local
governmental decisionmakers to grant or deny permission to use the public
rights-of-way "may... have the effect of prohibiting" the provision of
telecommunications services in violation of the [Federal Telecommunications
Act].
Id.; see also N.J. Payphone Ass'n v. Town of West New York, 130 F. Supp. 2d 631, 637
(D.N.J. 2001).
The Sixth Circuit derided. as "sophistry" the argument that the City's
requirement to enter into a franchise and pay a franchise fee was a violation of section
253(a). But that court did not appear to recognize the safe harbor analysis that could
permit a franchise fee that meets the requirements of subsection (c). See T.C.G. Detroit
v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000). In its revised opinion in City of
Auburn, apparently to avoid a clear split with the Sixth Circuit on the point, the Ninth
Circuit revised the text and added a footnote to state that it was relying on "the variety of
methods and bases on which a city may deny a franchise, not the mere franchise
requirement, or the possibility of denial alone." City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d
at 1176 & n. 11, amending 247 F.3d 966 (2001). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit did not
say that a franchise requirement alone could not violate section 253(a), and it noted that
"a regulatory structure that allows a city to bar a telecommunications provider from
operating in the city... [violates] 47 U.S.C. § 253(a)." Id.
[Vol. 107:2
RIGHTS-OF-WAY REDUX
In addition, that a franchise may be revoked for failure of the
telecommunications company to abide by a franchise's terms, or that
other harsh penalties may accompany franchise violations, triggers
subsection (a). In City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., the Ninth Circuit
recognized that, in the final analysis, "[t]he ultimate cudgel" was the
municipality's ability to revoke the franchise and to remove the wireline
company's facilities from the rights-of-way if the company failed to
observe the franchise requirements. 47 The court ruled also that the threat
of criminal sanctions for violation of a franchise requirement itself "can
indubitably only be described as a prohibition."'
148
This does not necessarily mean, of course, that franchise
requirements or penalties for violating ordinances or franchises are
impermissible under the Telecommunications Act. 149  That question
cannot be answered without considering whether the franchise
requirements are "saved" by the provisions of subsection (c). But the
prohibitions in section 253 are to be broadly construed. 150 As noted by
the court in Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's County,
although the Telecommunications Act does not prohibit franchises,
telecommunications providers may not be required to agree to terms that
would be inconsistent with subsection (c).' 5 '
There is no reason to exempt existing franchises from preemption
under section 253, assuming the provisions fail justification under the
criteria of subsection (c). So long as a franchise is required and the
existing franchise is subject to revocation or harsh penalties are
threatened for violations, the franchise stands as a "local legal
requirement" that "may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the
ability of any entity to provide.., telecommunications service" under
subsection (a).
152
147. City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d at 1176.
148. T.C.G.N.Y., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (quoting AT&T
Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Austin, 975 F. Supp. 928, 939 (W.D.
Tex. 1997), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 2000)). In Board of County
Commissioners v. Qwest Corp., the court found that the civil and criminal penalties in a
right-of-way ordinance, along with "extensive reporting requirements that if not
specifically met would result in termination of the franchise" had the effect of prohibiting
telecommunications services in violation of section 253(a). 169 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1246
(D.N.M. 2001).
149. See, e.g., AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 52 F.
Supp. 2d 763, 769 (N.D. Tex. 1999), vacated as moot, 243 F.3d 928 (5th Cir. 2001); Bell
Atl.-Md. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d. at 816.
150. See, e.g., AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 52 F.
Supp. 2d at 769; AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F.
Supp. 2d 582, 591 (N.D. Tex. 1998); AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v.
City of Austin, 975 F. Supp. at 939.
151. 49 F. Supp. 2d at 816 n.25.
152. See City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d at 1175 (quoting 47 U.S.C. §
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The only case to consider the issue directly-City of Dallas v.
Metropolitan Fiber Systems of Dallas, Inc. '53-held that the Act does not
apply to pre-existing franchises. But that court focused on what it
believed was the Act's intent, rather than its language. The court found
no "barrier to entry" to exist in the case of a franchise that pre-dated the
1996 Telecommunications Act. 154 Section 253, however, does not speak
directly of barriers to entry; it is couched in terms of "prohibitions."
And, far from exempting existing franchises, section 253(a) states clearly
that "[n]o local legal requirement" that has "the effect of prohibiting the
ability of any entity to provide.., telecommunications service" is
permissible. 55  The language contains no justification for refusing to
extend the Act's protection to pre-existing franchises. 1
56
The courts have not taken a consistent line in determining whether
municipal fees are permissible under section 253(c). The statutory
standard-that the fees must not exceed "fair and reasonable
compensation" and must be "competitively neutral and non-
discriminatory"-has been subject to varying interpretations.
As an initial matter, it should be clear that section 253(c) does not
authorize municipal fees where such fees are not otherwise authorized
under state law. The language of the section states merely that
"[n]othing in this section affects the authority" of the local government to
impose reasonable, competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory fees.
157
The language does not purport to create such authority.'58
253(a) (2002)).
153. No. 3-98-CV-2128-R, 2000 WL 198104 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2000).
154. Id. at *5.
155. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).
156. The City of Dallas court recognized (correctly) that franchises entered into after
the Telecommunications Act was enacted on February 8, 1996, were subject to
preemption under section 253. 2000 WL 198104, at *5; see also AT&T Communications
of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 52 F. Supp. 2d 756, 760 (N.D. Tex. 1998)
(finding that franchises entered into after passage of the Act were preempted), vacated as
moot, 243 F.3d 928 (5th Cir. 2001). The United States District Court for the District of
Oregon reviewed the reasonableness of an existing franchise under section 253(c) in
Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, No. 01-1005-JE, 2002 WL 834051 (D. Or. Mar. 22,
2002). It is not clear from the opinion whether the franchise was entered into before or
after the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
157. The loose language of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in AT&T
Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Austin to the effect that section 253(c)
makes use of streets "compensable" is clearly wrong. See 235 F.3d 241, 243 (5th Cir.
2000). So also is language in Bell Atlantic-Maryland that local governments are
"expressly authorized under Section 253(c) to demand some type of compensation from
telecommunications providers for use of public rights-of-way." 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817
(D. Md. 1999).
158. Any federal statutory language purporting to give a municipality authority to
charge a fee or tax not authorized under state law must be clear beyond debate. See infra
notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
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The starting point in any analysis of whether a fee is "fair and
reasonable" under section 253(c) must be whether the fee is authorized
under state law.1 59  If the fee is not authorized, clearly it cannot be
"reasonable.,,' 60 But, even if a municipal fee is authorized under state
law, it is not necessarily "fair and reasonable compensation" or
"competitively neutral and non-discriminatory" under section 253(c). A
number of courts have held that the fees must be limited to "the cost to
the [municipality] of maintaining and improving the public rights-of-way
that [the telecommunications provider] actually uses."1 61 These cases
have rejected municipal fees that are based-as are most-on a
percentage of the gross revenues of telecommunications providers.'
62
Some of these cases have also analyzed the degree of usage of the rights-
of-way, refusing to permit fees to be imposed on entities that access the
rights-of-way only by using the facilities of others. 63 In striking down
fees, some courts have also held that fees recovering more than a
municipality's costs cannot be "compensatory" within the meaning of
section 253(c). 164
B. The City of Dearborn Case and Its Progeny
Four cases have suggested the contrary-that municipal fees may be
deemed "fair and reasonable," even if based on a percentage of revenue
and clearly exceeding the municipality's costs. 165  The first of these
159. In Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's County, the Fourth Circuit
vacated and remanded the district court's decision for failure to consider the state law
issues. 212 F.3d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 2000).
160. See City of Hawarden v. U.S.W. Communications, Inc., 590 N.W.2d 504, 510
(Iowa 1999) (noting its "obvious conclusion" that a fee that is not authorized "is neither
reasonable nor nondiscriminatory in its application"). In most cases, of course, courts
will not reach the question whether a fee is preempted under section 253 if the fee is not
authorized under state law. See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Coral
Springs, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
161. Bell Atl.-Md., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 818; see also
Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1100 (N.D.
Cal. 2001); PECO Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, No. 99-4766, 1999 WL
1240941, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1999); AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc.
v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
162. Bell Atl.-Md., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 817-18; PECO
Energy, 1999 WL 1240941, at *8 ("[R]evenue-based fees cannot, by definition, be based
on pure compensation for use of the rights-of-way.").
163. See, e.g., AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Austin, 40 F.
Supp. 2d 852, 856 (W.D. Tex. 1998), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 2000);
AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
164. Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1100; N.J.
Payphone Ass'n v. Town of West New York, 130 F. Supp. 2d 631, 638 (D.N.J. 2001).
165. T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789 (E.D. Mich. 1998),
affd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000); Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Port Auth., No.
99-CIV-0060, 1999 WL 494120, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1999) (dicta); T.C.G.N.Y., Inc.
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cases, T. C. G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn,166 is grounded in large part on
a faulty historical reliance on the rental discussion in St. Louis . Two of
the other cases adopt the Dearborn court's reliance on St. Louis I without
further analysis. 167 The fourth and most recent case, Qwest Corp. v. City
of Portland, addressed the reasonableness of the fee only as a third
alternative basis for upholding the ordinance.' 68 This decision also relies
on Dearborn, but here, in addition, the facts showed that the wireline
company had willingly agreed to the fee in its franchise and had
sponsored state legislation that would have explicitly authorized the
fee. 169
The district court decision in Dearborn was the first opinion to
address the whether municipal wireline fees were fair and reasonable
under section 253. T.C.G. Detroit, a telecommunications provider
hoping to compete with Ameritech, the incumbent local exchange
carrier, proposed to place its fiber optic cables beneath the City's streets
in existing conduit owned by the electric power company Detroit
Edison. 170 The cable would be owned by Detroit Edison, but leased back
to T.C.G. Detroit. 171  The City demanded that T.C.G. Detroit pay an
annual fee of four percent of its gross revenues, as well as a one-time
charge of $50,000.172 The City argued that the various fees represented a
reasonable "rental" under St. Louis I for T.C.G. Detroit's use of the
streets. 173 T.C.G. Detroit argued that Congress intended that the term
"fair and reasonable compensation" in section 253 should be given the
same meaning as the term "just and reasonable" rates under the Federal
Pole Attachments Act. 174 Neither argument presented the court with a
v. City of White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d 81, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Qwest Corp. v. City of
Portland, 200 F. Supp. 2d. 1250 (D. Or. 2002). Two other cases have upheld fees. In one
case, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, the court did not
analyze the fee other than to state that a fee equal to a percentage of revenue generated
"is not inherently unfair or unreasonable as a measure of the franchise's value as a
business asset to the franchisee." 522 S.E.2d 804, 808 (S.C. 1999). In the other case,
AT&T Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc. v. City of Eugene, the court held
that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that an ordinance violated section 253(a), and did
not reach the fee issue. 35 P.3d 1029 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
166. 16 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Mich. 1998), affd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
167. Onmipoint Communications, Inc. v. Port Auth., 1999 WL 494120, at *6;
T.C.G.N.Y., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d 81, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
168. Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1259.
169. Id.
170. T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 786-87.
171. Id. at 786-87.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 790-91.
174. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2002). The Pole Attachments Act limits a utility's recovery for
providing pole attachment space to cable operators and certain telecommunications




viable analytic framework under section 253.
Unable to find any authority to support T.C.G. Detroit's position,
the court accepted the City's argument. The court stated that section 253
"specifically" allows charging "rent," which the court equated to
"compensation."'' 7 5 Where the court found any reference in the statute to
"rent"-much less a "specific" reference-is unexplained. The court
then relied on the 1893 St. Louis I case 176 as recognizing "the general
right of a city to seek compensation from a user of the city's land/right-
of-way."' 177 Without repeating our earlier exhaustive analysis of St. Louis
1,178 it is enough here to say that the Dearborn court's reliance on St.
Louis I for the proposition that municipalities may rent their rights-of-
way is misplaced.
Ironically, the Dearborn court refused to consider T.C.G. Detroit's
argument that the City was not permitted to charge "rent" under
Michigan law. 179  By this refusal, the court failed to consider an
argument that might have established, beyond question, that the fee was
not "reasonable."'180  The court failed to recognize that the Supreme
Court's decision in St. Louis 118 1 belatedly accepted the critical
importance of state law in considering whether the fees were permissible.
The Dearborn court's reliance on St. Louis I was doubly ironic
because the Supreme Court had relied heavily on its perception that
Western Union's poles constituted a "permanent and exclusive
appropriation of a part of the highway."' 82 T.C.G. Detroit, on the other
hand, did not intend to place a single pole or conduit in the City's streets
and intended to rely entirely on the existing conduit of Detroit Edison.'
83
It is thus not evident what the Dearborn court was referring to when it
stated: "[T]here is nothing inappropriate with the city charging
compensation, or 'rent', [sic] for the City owned property that the
175. T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 789. "First, there is
nothing inappropriate with the city charging compensation, or 'rent', [sic] for the City
owned property that the Plaintiff seeks to appropriate for its private use. The statute
specifically allows it." Id. No language authorizing a rental charge, however, is found in
the Act.
176. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893) [hereinafter St. Louis
f], reh'g denied, 149 U.S. 465 (1893) [hereinafter St. Louis I1].
177. T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 789.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 51-68.
179. See T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 790 n. 1
180. See City of Hawarden v. U.S.W. Communications, Inc., 590 N.W.2d 504, 510
(Iowa 1999).
181. St. Louis If, 149 U.S. 465 (1893).
182. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893) [hereinafter St. Louis
f], reh'g denied, 149 U.S. 465 (1893).
183. T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 787.
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Plaintiff seeks to appropriate for its private use."'' 84 T.C.G. Detroit was
apparently "appropriating" no property, and indeed was not affecting the
city streets in any measurable way. Although the court noted that T.C.G.
Detroit intended to run approximately twenty-seven miles of cable within
the City's rights-of-way, the company was intending to do so entirely
within existing Detroit Edison conduit.
18 5
Even had T.C.G. Detroit intended to place its own poles or conduit
in the Dearborn streets, it is questionable whether the concerns expressed
by the Supreme Court in St. Louis I would justify more than nominal
fees. Despite the St. Louis I Court's concern about congestion of
municipal streets with numerous utility poles, utilities have for decades
shared pole usage among the various users, limiting the number of poles.
The 1866 Post Road Act, which gave telegraph companies the right to
occupy "post roads," was never extended to other types of utilities,
including telephone companies, 186 and the Act was eventually
repealed. 187  Municipalities today commonly require that utilities
occupying the streets move their facilities, as necessary, to make room
for road enhancements, widenings, and so on, including the obligation to
move facilities underground where the municipality determines that all
aerial wires should be buried.188  At most, therefore, the presence of
utility poles on municipal streets is a temporary occupancy, subject to
reasonable regulation by the municipality. Wireline carriers do not
receive anything in the nature of the bundle of rights that a "renter"
receives. 189  Furthermore, the use of streets for wireline companies'
facilities is wholly consistent with the continued use of the streets for
their primary purpose of carrying pedestrian and vehicular traffic.
The other factors considered by the Dearborn court fare little better.
First, the court looked to "what other telecommunications providers
would be willing to pay" and the prior "dealings between the parties."' 90
These two criteria suffer from a similar deficiency. They fail to
recognize that section 253, as intended by Congress, fundamentally
changed the nature of the relationship between telecommunications
184. Id. at 789.
185. Id. at 787.
186. See City of Richmond v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 174 U.S. 761 (1899).
187. Act of July 16, 1947, ch. 256, § 1, 61 Stat. 327 (1947).
188. See, e.g., LEBANON, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 7256, § 10(D) (1996); A Cable
Franchise Agreement Between Montgomery County, Md. & SBC Media Ventures, L.P. §
5(a)(10) (June 10, 1998) (on file with author); see also 12 MCQUILLN, supra note 36, §
34.74.10.
189. See, e.g., Vill. of Lombard v. I11. Bell Tel. Co., 90 N.E.2d 105, 109 (Ill. 1950)
("Rental implies possession or controlling the use of, exclusively, to the detriment of
those for whom it is held in trust.").
190. T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
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companies and municipalities. Until section 253's limitation of
municipal fees to "fair and reasonable compensation,"
telecommunications providers frequently had no ability to prevent
municipalities from requiring franchise fees that were not "fair and
reasonable." As the Illinois Supreme Court noted in American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Village of Arlington Heights,'91 earlier
actions of parties are irrelevant in situations of this type:
[I]t is immaterial that the [municipal] defendants have been able to
coerce other companies into similar agreements or that AT&T has
been coerced into such agreements in the past. The mere fact that
AT&T chose not to litigate every wrong thrust upon it does not
prevent it from asserting its rights at the present time.
That other parties had been "coerced" into agreeing to pay the fee in
Dearborn, and that T.C.G. Detroit had discussed paying such a fee with
the City before the Telecommunications Act completely changed the
relationship of the parties, is hardly a valid basis on which to find the fee
"fair and reasonable."
Finally, the Dearborn court looked to whether the fees were "so
excessive that they [were] likely to render doing business
unprofitable."'1 93 Although whether a fee would drive a company into the
red would surely be relevant, this standard would raise the bar much too
high. Not only would such a standard be extremely unwieldy and
difficult of proof, it would permit fees to be set according to the differing
circumstances of each company. Fees set according to such a criterion
would necessarily raise serious issues under the other criteria clearly set
forth in section 253(c), which require that fees be competitively neutral
and non-discriminatory.
In affirming the decision of the district court in Dearborn, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals conducted little of its own analysis, thus failing
to require this critical aspect of the district court's decision to survive the
rigor that might have been imposed through the writing of an appellate
opinion. Any kind of careful analysis by the Sixth Circuit panel might
have saved it from the unfortunate assertion that the district court's
analysis relating to the fairness and reasonableness of the fee was
"thorough and its reasoning sound." 194  The district court's analysis,
though unquestionably an honest effort at dealing with a statute that had
not been previously analyzed, 95 was anything but "sound."
191. 620 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. 1993).
192. Id. at 1046.
193. T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
194. T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 625 (6thCir. 2000).
195. The district court's decision was handed down in August 1998. T.C.G. Detroit
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The District Court for the Southern District of New York referenced
the Dearborn analysis in two decisions issued the next year-Omnipoint
Communications, Inc. v. Port Authority 96 and TC.G. New York, Inc. v.
City of White Plains.197 The first of these cases, Omnipoint, though
favoring the reasoning of the Dearborn court, did not rely on it. The
court in Omnipoint noted that, even were it to adopt the reasoning of the
several other courts that had limited fees under section 253(c) to "costs,"
Omnipoint had not presented evidence that the fees would exceed the
Port Authority's reasonable costs.' 98 In the White Plains case, the court
simply followed the "authority" of the earlier Omnipoint decision, issued
by another judge from the same court.' 
99
The final case in this quartet, Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland,
200
relied largely on two other bases for upholding the municipal fee and
discussed the Dearborn case in a third alternative holding. The court
quoted from the decision by the Sixth Circuit in Dearborn in a brief
statement that "compensation" and "costs" were not the same.20 1 But the
court in Qwest Corp. was apparently swayed heavily by the wireline
operator's agreement to pay the challenged fee, as well as its sponsoring
state legislation earlier that would have explicitly authorized the fee.2°2
C. A Better Analysis: Relying on the Language and Legislative History
of Section 253
In contrast to the Dearborn case and the cases favoring its analysis,
the cases limiting the safe harbor of section 253(c) to compensation
directly related to municipal right-of-way costs rely on analyses with
roots in the language of the subsection, historic precedent and the
section's legislative history.
The language of subsection (c) itself squarely limits the range of
permissible fees. The word "compensation" suggests a reference to the
v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785. Prior to that time, only two cases had been
decided related to municipal fees challenged under section 253. Neither the decisions in
the City of Austin cases, 40 F. Supp. 2d 852; 975 F. Supp. 928, nor the decision in the
City of Dallas case, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, issued before the Dearborn decision was released
by the district court, analyzed the fee issue in any detail. No other cases addressing
section 253 are cited by the Dearborn district court.
196. No. 99-CIV-0060, 1999 WL 494120 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1999).
197. 125 F. Supp. 2d 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
198. Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Port Auth., 1999 WL 494120, at *8.
199. T.C.G.N.Y., Inc. v. White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 96.
200. 200 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (D. Or. 2002).





damage to be caused the holder of the underlying property right.2 °3 In
the seminal case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City
of Chicago,2 °4 the Supreme Court upheld a jury award of $1 as "just
compensation" for a city's use of a railroad right-of-way because "the
opening of the street across the railroad tracks did not unduly interfere
with the [railroad's] use of the [right-of-way] for legitimate railroad
,,205purposes. Because the railroad company was not prevented from
using its right-of-way, the Court held that nominal compensation was
appropriate.2 °6 These principles, established more than a century ago
when questions of utility use of rights-of-way were being commonly
raised, continue to be followed: The only compensation due to the
holder of a right-of-way for a consistent use is "for any diminution in
value of its right-of-way property as a result of the new [use]. 207 As
noted recently by the District Courts for the District of New Jersey and
the Northern District of California, a wireline fee that does more than
make a municipality whole "is not compensatory in the literal sense. 20 8
The language in subsection (c) also establishes that the
compensation must be "for" the "use" of the rights-of-way. As several
cases have held, this language establishes the need for some direct tie
between the compensation exacted and the particular use of the rights-of-
way by the telecommunications provider. 20 9 The language suggests both
203. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 354 (4th ed. 1957) (defining
"compensation" as "[i]ndemnification; payment of damages; making amends; making
whole ...; that which is necessary to restore an injured party to his former position");
JuLIus L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 15.15 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that,
when a "telegraph company (or any utility company for that matter) acquires the right to
maintain its lines along a railroad location... [t]he railroad company is not entitled to
recover the market value of that portion" and that compensation "is limited to the
decrease in the value of the use of the right-of-way for railroad purposes by reason of its
being concurrently used for telegraph purposes").
204. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
205. Id. at 242.
206. Id. at 256; see also Or. Short Line Ry. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 111 F. 842
(9th Cir. 1901); City of Oakland v. Schenck, 241 P. 545 (Cal. 1925).
207. Green Bay & W.R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 68 N.W.2d 828, 834 (Wis.
1955); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 380 N.E.2d 812,
816 (111. App. Ct. 1978) (stating that compensation owed limited to decrease in value of
the land as it is used, and may be nominal).
208. N.J. Payphone Ass'n v. Town of West New York, 130 F. Supp. 2d 631, 638
(D.N.J. 2001); Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1100 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see also Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Qwest Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d
1243, 1251 (D.N.M. 2001) ("[T]he amount of a User Fee must directly relate to the
County's expenses incurred in managing the actual physical use of the public right of
way.").
209. See, e.g., AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F.
Supp. 2d 582, 593 (N.D. Tex. 1998); AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v.
City of Austin, 40 F. Supp. 2d 852, 856 (W.D. Tex. 1998), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d
241 (5th Cir. 2000); Bell Atl.-Md., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805,
2002]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
that "revenue-based" fees with no direct relationship to "use of the public
rights-of-way, ' 210 are inappropriate and that the degree of such use is
plainly relevant to the analysis.
211
Other courts also have balked at the idea that a fee based on gross
receipts has any relationship to a company's use of the streets. In City of
Chicago Heights v. Public Service Co., 2 12 the Illinois Supreme Court
noted that "a fee or imposition based upon gross receipts has no relation
to the amount of space in a street used by wires or poles of a given
company." Basing a fee on gross receipts is "purely arbitrary and
discriminatory in its nature. 213
The FCC, in an amicus curiae brief to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, called fees based on a percentage of gross revenues
"problematic" under section 253(c). 214 "A percentage of gross revenues-
based fee, even if uniformly applied," said the FCC, "might well have no
relationship to either the extent of the carrier's use of the rights-of-way
or the costs imposed on the municipality. 21 5 Although the brief noted
that "the FCC has not addressed the specific issue," it recognized "a
serious question whether a gross revenues based fee is 'fair and
reasonable compensation.., for use of public rights of way' within the
meaning of section 253(c)."
216
The legislative history of section 253(c) supports those cases that
have given the safe harbor limited application. Congress adopted an
817 (D. Md. 1999), vacated and remanded for consid. of state law issues, 212 F.3d 863
(4th Cir. 2000); PECO Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, No. 99-4766, 1999 WL
1240941, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1999); Qwest Communications Corp v. City of
Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
210. Bell Atl.-Md v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 817; PECO Energy,
1999 WL 1240941, at *8 (stating that, "by definition," fees may not be "revenue-based").
211. Bell Atl.-Md. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 818; AT&T
Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 593; see also
N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes & Assessment, 280 U.S. 338, 349 (1930) (stating
that "it is well known" that the amount of telephone facilities placed by telephone
companies in different streets varies widely, and that there is "no precedent for the use of
gross earnings as a measure of the value of a single element of such a [telephone] plant").
212. 97 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 1951).
213. Id. at 272.
214. Brief of Amici Curiae Federal Communications Commission and United States,
T.C.G.N.Y., Inc. v. City of White Plains, Nos. 01-7213(L) & 01-7255(XAP), 2002 WL
31045144 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2002).
215. Id.
216. Id. Representatives of municipal interests were unhappy with the quoted
language and requested that the Commission's General Counsel revise the brief.
Although noting that the language "was not intended to represent a definitive FCC
position that Section 253 precludes any compensation above cost recovery," the General
Counsel declined to revise the brief, observing that it "says what it says." Letter from




amendment offered by Representatives Bart Stupak and Joe Barton
rejecting the bill's original provision that would have required
municipalities to charge the same fees to different telecommunications
providers.21 7 Representative Stupak, in offering the amendment, stated
his belief that cities "must be able to distinguish between different
telecommunications providers" based on their use of the rights-of-way.21 8
He noted that companies placed differing burdens on the rights-of-way
depending on whether the companies dug up the streets and on the miles
of rights-of-way used by the companies. His amendment intended that
municipalities be permitted to recognize these differing levels of burden
in their fees.
2 19
D. The Municipal Response: Fees To Reflect Congestion or Street
Maintenance Costs
It seems evident that the courts will soon have to deal with attempts
by municipalities to structure their fees on telecommunications providers
in new and different ways to avoid the growing weight of authority that
fees based on a percentage of gross receipts do not meet the criteria of
section 253(c). The caselaw contains suggestions that municipal fees
may be appropriate to reduce congestion and to maintain the streets.
Each of these theories relates to an arguable regulatory cost.
220
Although there seems little question that reducing congestion is a
legitimate regulatory goal and that municipal fees may generally be used
to achieve it, it is difficult to posit a situation where a legitimate case
could be made here. Whatever one may think of the aesthetics of utility
poles and their suspended wires and cables, there is no evident crowding
of poles on city streets that would justify a municipal "congestion" fee
for the purpose of discouraging additional wires. Nor is there evidence
of sufficient crowding of underground ducts to suggest that a fee is
needed to ration use. In any case, section 253 clearly preempts any fee
that attempts to ration right-of-way use. A municipality may not,
consistent with section 253, impose a fee that has the intention or effect
217. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 243(e) (1995); see also 141 CONG. REC. H8425,
H8427 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
218. 141 CONG. REc. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Stupak).
219. Id. "[l]f a company plans to run 100 miles of trenching in our streets and wires
to all parts of cities, it imposes a different burden on the right-of-way than a company
that just wants to string a wire across two streets to a couple of buildings." Id. The
Barton-Stupak amendment was intended to ensure that cites were not required to charge
the same fee "regardless of how much or how little they use the right-of-way or rip up
our streets." Id.
220. The cases also suggest that regulatory fees may be used to discourage
undesirable conduct. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Plainly, fees may not be
used to discourage the provision of telecommunications services.
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of prohibiting telecommunications providers from adding more facilities
to the right-of-way, at least so long as there are other means to "manage
the public rights-of-way" under section 253(c).
22 1
The extent to which a municipality may impose a fee intended to
help maintain the streets raises different issues. A municipality may
require a telecommunications provider to restore the street to a condition
comparable to the condition prior to being excavated. And presumably
the municipality may choose to make the restoration itself, at the
reasonable expense of the excavator. 222  According to the legislative
history of section 253, the section would not prohibit a municipality from
"requir[ing] a company to pay fees to recover an appropriate share of the
increased street repair and paving costs that result from repeated
excavation." 223 But a municipality may not, under the guise of charging
to maintain the street, impose a fee that is used to construct or improve
224the streets. An exaction used to construct public facilities, such as
streets, is plainly a tax that may not be imposed in the absence of explicit
taxing authority.225 And even where such taxing authority resides in the
municipality, it may not be used where the effect is to prohibit the
provision of telecommunications services. A local tax to construct
streets could not be construed either as "management of the public
rights-of-way" or as "fair and reasonable compensation ... for use of
public rights-of-way. 226
221. Any attempt to ration right-of-way use through municipal fees intended to
reduce the number of wires on poles and in conduits would also be inconsistent with
section 224(f) of the Telecommunications Act. 47 U.S.C. § 224(o (2002). That
provision requires utility pole owners to provide non-discriminatory access to their poles
and conduits. See id.
222. But see Boston Gas Co. v. City of Newton, 682 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (Mass. 1997)
(finding that excavation fees are not permitted where statute gave utility obligation to
restore street to original condition); N.Y. Tel. Co. v. City of Amsterdam, 613 N.Y.S.2d
993, 995-96 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (finding that excavation fee of $13 per square foot
was not permitted where clearly disproportionate to costs of permits, inspections and
enforcement and moneys deposited in general fund).
223. 141 CONG. REc. 58172 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
224. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., N.Y. Tel. Co. v. City of Amsterdam, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
226. 47 U.S.C. § 253(c). Although municipalities have opposed actions brought
under section 253 on the grounds that the section does not create a private right of action,
the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits have disagreed, and the Ninth Circuit has permitted
actions raising section 253 claims to be brought under the Supremacy Clause. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2001): City of
Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1174 (9th Cir. 2001); T.C.G. Detroit v. City of
Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of
Berkeley, No. C 0 1-0663 SI, 2001 WL 1867722 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2002).
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E. Limitations Imposed by the Cable Act
In 1984 Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act,
the first congressional effort to provide a comprehensive scheme of
227regulation for cable television. Among other things, the Act imposed a
maximum level-five percent of gross revenues-on franchise fees that
could be collected by state and municipal governments from cable
operators.2 28 Franchise fees include "any tax, fee, or assessment of any
kind imposed by a franchising authority or governmental entity on a
cable operator or cable subscriber, or both, solely because of their status
as such."229  Excluded from the definition, however, are
nondiscriminatory taxes, fees or assessments "of general applicability
(including any such tax, fee or assessment imposed on both utilities and
cable operators or their services ... ).,,230 Under this exclusion,
nondiscriminatory taxes applied to all utilities for street access would not
be subject to the federal franchise fee maximum.
The Act was amended in 1996 to clarify that gross revenues
include only revenues derived by cable operators from the provision of
"cable services., 23 1 The Senate report on the 1996 amendment describes
its intention: "to make clear that the franchise fee provision is not
intended to reach revenues that a cable operator derives for providing
new telecommunications services over its system that are different from
the cable-related revenues operators have traditionally derived from their
systems. 232
Section 622(a) of the Cable Act states that, "[s]ubject to the
limitation of subsection (b), any cable operator may be required under
the terms of any franchise to pay a franchise fee." Although subsection
(b) limits the maximum amount to five percent of gross revenues, neither
subsection (a), nor any other provision of the Act, explicitly authorizes
fees up to that amount. Section 622(a) does not say that franchise fees
are subject only to the limitations of subsection (b), and no such
227. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779.
228. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b). The Act actually increased the maximum level above that
permitted by the FCC since 1972. Beginning in 1972 the FCC had permitted franchising
authorities to charge cable operators three percent of gross revenues, unless there was a
showing that the franchising authority's regulatory expenses exceeded that amount. In
the latter case, the fee could be increased to five percent of gross revenues. See Cable
Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 141, 219-20 (1972).
229. 47 U.S.C. § 542(g)(1).
230. Id. § 542(g)(2)(A). The Act also excludes from the definition payments required
by franchise for capital costs for public, educational or governmental access facilities and
payments "incidental to the awarding or enforcing of the franchise." Id. § 542(g)(2).
231. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 303(b), 110 Stat. 56,
125 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 542(b)).
232. S. REP. No. 104-23, at 36 (1995).
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expansive reading of subsection (a) is warranted.
To read subsection (a) as a grant of authority to municipalities to
charge fees that are not otherwise authorized by the state would directly
impact state law governing municipal powers. Any congressional
interference in the relationship between a state and its political
subdivisions is permissible "only when Congress has manifested its
intention with unmistakable clarity. 233  Interpreting the language of
section 622(a) to authorize municipalities to impose franchise fees in
amounts not clearly provided for under state law would fail that test.
Subsection (a) simply means that federal law neither permits nor limits
cable franchise fees, except for the five-percent maximum amount
specified in subsection (b).
23 4
Any cable television franchise fee, therefore, even after the Cable
Act, must be authorized in the first instance by state law. Although some
municipalities may be authorized explicitly to charge fees up to the
federal maximum by state statute or charter provisions, 235 most municipal
franchise fees simply stem from the municipal ability to enter into
franchise contracts.236 In return for the right to provide cable service in
the community, the cable operator agrees to pay franchise fees.
Under the Cable Act, franchise fees may be passed directly through
233. City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)). The D.C. Circuit also declared that "interfering
with the relationship between a State and its political subdivisions strikes near the heart
of State sovereignty." Id. at 52; see also Cable TV Fund 14-A, Ltd. v. City of Naperville,
No. 96-C5962, 1997 WL 280692, at *16 (N.D. I11. May 21, 1997) (quoting Warner Cable
Communications v. Borough of Schuylkill Haven, 784 F. Supp. 203, 214 (E.D. Pa.
1992)) ("[T]he power to create municipalities and define the limits of their powers is
quintessentially a state function.").
In the Schuylkill Haven case, the court considered section 613(d) of the Cable
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 533(e), which provides that a "franchising authority may hold an
ownership interest in a cable system." 784 F. Supp. at 212. Holding that "Congress had
no intention of granting powers to municipalities that the municipalities did not have
under state law," the court found the statutory language "permissive rather than
empowering." Id. at 213.
234. See, e.g., City of Walnut Creek v. UACC Midwest, Inc., No. C 96-04335 SI,
1997 WL 85009, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1997). Although the House report on the
Cable Act contains ambiguous language that could be interpreted to authorize franchise
fees, there is nothing in the language of the Act or the legislative history that would
indicate a clear congressional intention to dictate to the states that they must permit their
municipalities to impose such fees where they would not otherwise be permitted under
state law. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 26, 63 (1984).
235. See, e.g., Cox Cable Hampton Roads, Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 410 S.E.2d 652
(Va. 1991) (finding that Norfolk City Charter conferred taxation authority); see also NEV.
REV. STAT. 354.59883 (2002) (authorizing municipal fees up to five percent of gross
revenues).
236. See, e.g., Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204 (Ind. 1990) (finding
franchise fee permitted under city's right to bargain for franchise contract).
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to cable customers and itemized on their bills.237 With that ability, few
cable operators have chosen to bring judicial challenges against
municipal franchise fees that do not exceed the federal maximum for
cable services.238 At the same time, many cable operators have been
willing to accept municipal demands in franchise renewal negotiations to
agree to pay the federal maximum fee. But, with the dollar amounts and
competitive bite of franchise fees increasing annually, it is inevitable that
cable operators will be less willing to agree to the federal maximum fees
in franchise renewal negotiations going forward.
The variety of services delivered by cable operators is expanding
and the competitive landscape is rapidly changing. In addition to
traditional cable services, cable operators are the leaders in providing
high-speed data and Internet access services.2 39 Several large cable
operators already provide circuit-switched telephone service, and other
cable operators are experimenting with the provision of Internet protocol
("IP") telephony over their systems. Competition is growing for all
services. 240 Direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") providers gained more
than three million video subscribers from June 2000 to June 2001, an
increase of more than ten percent. In addition to increased experiments
with high-speed digital subscriber line ("DSL") technology to provide
video entertainment services, telephone companies have an estimated 4.3
million high-speed Internet access subscribers.241 Wireless and DBS
providers are also beginning to offer competitive high-speed Internet
access. 2 42 Neither DBS nor wireless operators pay municipal franchise
fees on any of their services, nor, typically, their equivalent in state taxes.
Meanwhile, telecommunications companies are challenging the
authority of municipalities to impose fees above the cost of regulation. It
237. Franchise Fee "Pass Through," 13 F.C.C.R. 4566 (1998); 47 C.F.R. § 76.922
(2002). Cable operators are also permitted to "itemize" the amount of the franchise fee
on subscriber bills. 47 U.S.C. § 542(c).
238. The few challenges that have been brought have been based on the First
Amendment and have largely been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City
of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 853 F.2d 1084 (3d
Cir. 1988).
239. The FCC's Video Programming Report states that, by June 2001, cable operators
had 5.6 million cable modem (cable data and internet access) subscribers, a six-month
increase of 1.7 million. VIDEO PROGRAMMING REPORT, supra note 2, para. 44.
240. Cox Communications and AT&T Broadband provide circuit-switched telephone
service. AOL Time Warner, Comcast, Charter, and AT&T all are experimenting with
cable-delivered IP telephony. Id. para. 50.
241. Id. para. 43 & n. 126. Analysts expect that, by 2004, 28.9 percent of all
households will access the Internet through cable modems and 21.1 percent through DSL.
Id.
242. Wireless and satellite providers currently have eight percent of the high-speed
Internet access market. Id. By 2004, 5.7 percent of households are expected to access
the Internet through broadband wireless and satellite technologies. Id. para. 44 & n. 126.
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seems inevitable that cable operators will soon be rising in force to
challenge the imposition of municipal fees not only on revenues received
from high-speed data, Internet access, and telephone services, but also
from traditional cable services.
Typical cable franchises run a maximum of ten to fifteen years.243
The Cable Act has established an expectation of franchise renewal,244
and, if cable operators are not able to negotiate a renewal on reasonable
terms, they are entitled to a formal administrative hearing and judicial
review. Section 626 of the Act provides that cable operators are entitled
to a renewal of franchises so long as they meet four specified criteria.245
In the absence of substantial questions about past performance and
continued legal, financial, and technical qualifications, cable operators
are entitled to have their franchises renewed if their renewal proposals
are reasonable in view of the future cable-related needs and interests of
the community and the related costs. 24 6 A general municipal desire to
augment its general fund certainly cannot be said to be a future cable-
related community need or interest.
Under the Act, franchise fees are understood to include operating
expenses in support of public, educational and governmental access
("PEG access") use of the cable system. 247 Only such payments agreed
to in franchises predating the 1984 Act are exempted from the Act's
"franchise fee" definition.248 Under this statutory scheme, payments
243. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 25 (1984).
244. E. Telecom Corp. v. Borough of East Conemaugh, 872 F.2d 30, 35 (3d Cir.
1989).
245. The statute details these criteria as whether:
(A) the cable operator has substantially complied with the material terms of the
existing franchise and with applicable law;
(B) the quality of the operator's service, including signal quality, response to
consumer complaints, and billing practices, but without regard to the mix or
quality of cable services or other services provided over the system has been
reasonable in light of community needs;
(C) the operator has the financial, legal, and technical ability to provide the
services, facilities, and equipment as set forth in the operator's proposal; and
(D) the operator's proposal is reasonable to meet the future cable-related
community needs and interests, taking into account the cost of meeting such
needs and interests.
47 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1) (2002).
246. Most disputes related to cable franchise renewals are focused on this criterion-
whether the cable operator's proposal "is reasonable to meet the future cable-related
community needs and interests, taking into account the cost of meeting such needs and
interests." Id. § 546(c)(1)(D).
247. PEG access programming is programming controlled by "local governments,
schools, and nonprofit and community groups" and carried over the cable system. H.R.
REP. No. 98-934, at 30 (1984); see also 47 U.S.C. § 531.
248. 47 U.S.C. § 542(g)(2)(B). Payments for PEG access capital costs are also
excluded from the definition of franchise fees. Id. § 542(g)(2)(C).
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made by cable operators under newer franchises in support of PEG
access operating costs would be permitted up to the point that the total
fees, including those in support of PEG access, do not exceed five
percent of gross revenues from cable services. The "need" for those
payments, however, would have to be demonstrated by the municipality,
and the revenues collected for that purpose would have to be spent on
PEG access. Only meeting PEG access needs and the municipality's
legitimate costs of regulation-at most--could be said to be cable-
related. And nothing in the Cable Act alone would justify a franchise fee
in excess of PEG access requirements and regulatory costs.
24 9
As existing franchises come up for renewal, cable operators will be
forced increasingly to question whether, based on state law,
municipalities may demand franchise fees up to the federal maximum.
Unless state law explicitly provides municipalities the authority to tax
cable operators, cable operators will likely resist agreeing to pay
franchise fees that exceed regulatory costs and demonstrated PEG access
operating needs.
Cable operators' attacks on municipal fees imposed by
municipalities on services other than "cable services" are not likely to
wait for a renewal context. The FCC recently determined that "cable
modem service is not a 'cable service' under the definition prescribed by
the Act., 250 The FCC also "tentatively conclude[d]" that the Cable Act
"does not provide an independent basis of authority for assessing
franchise fees on cable modem service."25' Why the FCC's conclusion
to that effect should be termed "tentative" is unclear. Once the FCC
determined that cable modem service is not cable service, the conclusion
that revenues from cable modem services do not constitute part of the
franchise fee "gross revenue" base follows indubitably. Only if the
courts overturn the FCC's determination that cable modem service is not
a "cable service" under the Cable Act should cable modem services be
subject to franchise fees under section 622.252
249. A municipality is entitled to recover its reasonable regulatory costs under the
historic precedents. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
250. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4833 (2002). The FCC defined "cable modem service" as
"a service that uses cable system facilities to provide residential subscribers with high-
speed Internet access, as well as many applications or functions that can be used with
high-speed Internet access." Id. at 4818-19. The Commission determined that cable
modem service is an "interstate information service." Id at 4802.
251. Id. at 4851. The FCC couched the issue in the wrong terms. As noted above, the
Cable Act does not provide any "independent basis for assessing franchise fees" on any
service. See supra text accompanying notes 233-36.
252. Municipal interests appealed the FCC's decision to the D.C. Circuit, from where
it was transferred to the Ninth Circuit, where the case now resides. National League of
Cities v. FCC, No. 02-71425 (9th Cir. May 24, 2002).
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Where a service is not a "cable service" but is provided over a
"cable system," the Act plainly prohibits the payment of any franchise
fee on a cable operator's revenues from it. "Cable service" is defined as
"the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or
(ii) other programming service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if any
which is required for the selection or use of such video programming or
other programming service., 253 A "cable system" is defined, in relevant
part, as "a facility... designed to provide cable service which includes
video programming. 254  Cable operators' IP telephone services, for
example, would clearly be covered by the statutory exclusion because
they are offered over the same facilities that provide cable service yet are
not "cable services."
Under the FCC's ruling that cable modem services are "information
services," rather than cable services, 255 or under the Ninth Circuit's City
of Portland ruling that Internet access is "telecommunications,, 256 these
services would not be subject to a municipal franchise fee. Whether
circuit-switched telephony services are offered by cable operators over a
"facility designed to provide cable service" will likely depend on the
facts that can be proved in the individual case.257 But, even if these
services are not offered over the "cable system," Congress has prohibited
any franchise fees on them. Section 621(b)(3)(B) of the Cable Act
prohibits franchising authorities from imposing "any requirement under
this title that has the purpose or effect of prohibiting, limiting, restricting,
or conditioning the provision of telecommunications service by a cable
operator or an affiliate thereof."
258
IV. Conclusion
The issues surrounding municipal wireline fees are likely to remain
on boil until the judicial decisions reach equipoise, as they largely did a
century ago regarding municipal efforts to exact "pole fees" from
253. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6).
254. Id. § 522(7).
255. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
256. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
257. At most, revenues from circuit-switched telephony offered by cable operators
would be subject to fees limited under section 253. See supra notes 203-19 and
accompanying text. But to the extent that cable operators' provision of circuit-switched
services are offered "with respect to any cable system," no fee would be permitted under
section 622(b). See supra notes 203-19 and accompanying text.
258. 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(B). The meaning of the reference to imposing
requirements "under this title" has never been explicated by the courts. To the extent that
a franchising authority attempted to impose fees under title II of the Communications
Act, section 253 of the Telecommunications Act would come into play. See supra notes
138-219 and accompanying text.
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telegraph and telephone companies. However, because municipalities
show no lessened desire for revenues, because telecommunications and
cable companies are facing increasing competition from entities that do
not pay wireline fees, and because the revenues at stake are growing
rapidly, the battle is expected to get even hotter before it is resolved.
Although some municipalities continue to allege an ability to collect
"rent" for the wireline companies' occupancy of the streets, that analysis
is misplaced. The case universally relied on for that theory-St. Louis
I--does not stand as good authority. Wireline charges in excess of
regulatory costs are either "taxes" or "franchise fees." If the charges are
taxes, they must be authorized explicitly by state law. And, even where
authorized by the state, they are closely limited by section 253 of the
Telecommunications Act and section 622 of the Cable Act. Section 253
limits municipal taxes related to right-of-way use by telecommunications
companies to regulatory costs. Section 622 of the Cable Act limits
municipal right-of-way fees that do not have general applicability to all
utilities to five percent of a cable operator's gross revenues derived by
the cable system from cable services.
If the wireline charges are franchise fees, they must be agreed to by
the wireline company. Municipal leverage to demand fees higher than
regulatory costs in new or renewed franchises is cabined by the
preemptive effect of the federal statutes. Telecommunications providers
have little incentive to agree to pay fees higher than the cost of regulation
when federal law carefully circumscribes the municipalities' ability to
deny them a franchise. Cable operators also have little incentive to agree
in franchise renewal discussions to pay franchise fees that exceed the
costs of regulation, plus justified costs of PEG access. The days when
municipalities can expect to pluck the golden goose of new
telecommunications and cable services are drawing to a close.
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